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THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW
Admiralty And Maritime Law
ADMIRALTY

- MAINTENANCE AND CURE - SEAMAN NOT ENTITLED
TO MAINTENANCE AND CURE PAYMENTS AFTER His ILLNESS OR
INJURY HAS BEEN DECLARED PERMANENT.

Cox v. Dravo Corp. (1975)
Plaintiff Cox, a seaman injured while in the service of his ship, filed
suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania against Dravo Corporation (Dravo)' seeking maintenance
and cure payments under general maritime law. 2 The district court found
that the plaintiff was permanently and totally disabled, that no cure could
be effected, and that treatment could not arrest further progress of plaintiff's deteriorating physical condition. 3 It was determined, however, that
medical treatments would relieve his pain.4 Cox was awarded $3,111.13
for cure5 and denied further maintenance payments. 6 Both parties appealed
the decision. 7
1. Cox v. Dravo Corp., 372 F. Supp. 1003 (W.D. Pa. 1974). Cox had previously
brought a negligence action against Dravo Corporation (Dravo) under the Jones Act
which provides in pertinent part:
Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment
may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of trial
by jury ....
46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970). In that action, Cox sought recovery for pain and suffering
and lost wages, past and future, but made no claim for maintenance and cure. 372
F. Supp. at 1004; see notes 5 and 6 infra. Cox was declared permanently and totally
disabled at that trial. 372 F. Supp. at 1004.
2. 372 F. Supp. at 1004. Maintenance and cure is an implied contractual right
giving a seaman, who becomes ill or is injured in the service of his ship, subsistence
and lodging (maintenance) and medical care (cure) until the maximum cure attainable has been effected. 2 M. Nonius, THE LAW OF SEAMEN § 539 (3d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as NoRRis].
Plaintiff Cox also sued for consequential damages for Dravo's alleged failure
to provide maintenance and cure. 372 F. Supp. at 1004. The district court found no
evidence to support this claim, id. at 1009, and no appeal was taken upon this issue.
3. 372 F. Supp. at 1005.
4. Id. at 1006.
5. Id. at 1010. The defendant had paid for medical expenses from June 28, 1964,
the date of the injury, until January, 1966, the date of trial in the first suit. Cox v.
Dravo Corp., 517 F.2d 620, 622 (3d Cir. 1975); see note 1 supra. Thus, the award
was for expenses incurred after that date. Id.
6. 372 F. Supp. at 1009. Cox had received maintenance payments from the date
of his injury until December 7, 1966. Id. at 1005. The district court believed that any
further maintenance award would be duplicative of damages Cox had received in his
previous negligence action against Dravo. Id. at 1008-09; see note 1 supra. The Third
Circuit disagreed with the district court on this point, noting that a claim for lost wages
is significantly different than a claim for maintenance payments. 517 F.2d at 623.
See generally Note, Maintenance, Shoreside Wages, and Mr. Crooks: A Proposed
End to Twin Beds and Six Meals A Day, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 935 (1973).
7. 517 F.2d at 620.
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The Third Circuit, sitting en banc,8 decided both appeals in favor of
Dravo, holding that a shipowner is not liable for maintenance and cure
after a seaman's injury has been declared permanent. Cox v. Dravo Corp.,
517 F.2d 620 (3d Cir. 1975).
In 1903, the Supreme Court first examined the question of maintenance
and cure in The Osceola.9 After reviewing the pertinent cases, 10 the Court
declared:
[T]he vessel and her owners are liable, in case a seaman falls sick,
or is wounded, in the service of the ship, to the extent of his maintenance and cure, and to his wages, at least so long as the voyage is
continued."'
The duration of the liability was further defined in 1938 when the Supreme
Court stated in Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor 1 2 that the duty to provide
maintenance and cure may extend for a "fair time after the voyage in ...
[order] to effect such improvement in the seaman's condition as reasonably
3
may be expected to result from nursing, care, and medical treatment,'
14
but not for life if the disability proves permanent.
Although the Calmar
decision dealt with an illness that was not caused by the seaman's service, 15
8. Judge Gibbons wrote the majority opinion. Chief Judge Seitz wrote a concurring opinion.
9. 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
10. Id. at 172-74. The obligation to provide maintenance and cure first appeared
in American maritime law in Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480 (No. 6047) (C.C.D.
Me. 1823). In that decision, Justice Story recognized, but did not define the extent of
the obligation. Id. at 482-83. In a subsequent case, Justice Story stated that the obligation remained in effect until "the cure is completed, at least so far as the ordinary
medical means extend .....
Reed v. Canfield, 20 F. Cas. 426, 429 (No. 11,041)
(C.C.D. Mass. 1832).
Justice Story's formulation was not accepted without criticism. Cf. The J.F.
Card, 43 F. 92 (D.C.E.D. Mich. 1890). "Subsequent cases have tended to limit the
doctrine of Reed v. Canfield, and it is doubtful if it can any longer be accepted as law."
Id. at 94. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court later adopted the Canfield test in Calmar
S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525 (1938), and reiterated the rule in Farrell v. United
States, 336 U.S. 511 (1949). See notes 12-18 and accompanying text infra.
11. 189 U.S. at 175 (emphasis added).
12. 303 U.S. 525 (1938).
13. Id. at 530.
14. Id. The Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit which had found the
seaman's condition to be incurable and awarded a lump sum based upon life expectancy.
Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525 (1938), rev'g 92 F.2d 84, 87 (3d Cir. 1937).
The Supreme Court disapproved this method of calculating future maintenance and
cure payments, because of the difficulty in measuring the amount and character of
medical care necessary for a given affliction. 303 U.S. at 531. The Court concluded:
The seaman's recovery must therefore be measured in each case by the reasonable cost of that maintenance and cure to which he is entitled at the time of
trial, including, in the discretion of the court, such amounts as may be needful in
the immediate future for the maintenance and cure of a kind and for a period
which can be definitely ascertained.
Id. at 531-32.
15. 303 U.S. at 529. The seaman in Calmar was suffering from Buerger's disease, "an incurable malady of the veins and arteries." Id. at 526. Although the
condition had been discovered when the seaman was examined after injuring his foot
while working on the ship, the district court found that his disease had not been
caused by the foot injury. Id. at 529.
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in Farrellv. United States16 the Court ruled that the shipowner's liability
was identical whether or not the seaman's condition had been caused by his
service. 17 The Court wrote that the shipowner's liability should continue
8
only "until [the seaman] was so far cured as possible."'
Despite these Supreme Court holdings, the Third Circuit had, until
Cox, applied a more liberal view. In Neff v. Dravo Corp.19 the court reversed a ruling that a seaman was not entitled to maintenance after his
disability was declared permanent. 20 Neff suffered from progressive
deterioration of the central nervous system, 2' and although he could not
have been cured, nor his progressive deterioration halted, treatment would
have relieved some of his pain. 22 The court held that the relief of pain
was "within the connotation of 'cure,' as used in the phrase 'maintenance
and cure.' "2 Relying upon that decision, the Third Circuit upheld an
award of maintenance and cure in Ward v. Union Barge Line,24 to a seaman who was incurably afflicted with rheumatoid arthritis. 25 The court
16. 336 U.S. 511 (1949).
17. Id. at 515. While returning to his ship from shore leave, Farrell fell over
a guard chain and into a dry dock. As a result, he was rendered totally and permanently blind, and became subject to periodic convulsions. Id. at 512-13. Farrell sought
maintenance payments for the rest of his life; however, cure was not an issue since he
received free medical treatments from government hospitals. Id.
For discussion of the reasons why a seaman's incapacity caused by his service
to the ship does not present a different category for maintenance and cure payments,
see Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724 (1943).
18. 336 U.S. at 518. The Court adopted the following test which originally had
been set forth in the Shipowner's Liability Convention of 1936: "The shipowner shall
be liable to defray the expense of medical care and maintenance until the sick or
injured person has been cured, or until the sickness or incapacity has been declared
of a permanent character." Id. at 517, quoting 54 Stat. 1693, 1696 (1939). It should
be noted that the Court was in no way obligated to follow this test since Article 12 of
the Convention provides: "Nothing in this Convention shall affect any law, award,
custom or agreement between shipowners and seamen which ensures more favourable
conditions than those provided by this Convention." 54 Stat 1700; see 336 U.S. at
524 n.4 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Recently, the Supreme Court relied on Farrell for the proposition that the
shipowner's duty to provide maintenance and cure existed until the incapacity was
declared permanent, even when the injury was, in fact, permanent from its inception.
Vella v. Ford Motor Co., 421 U.S. 1, 5 (1975), citing Farrell v. United States,
336 U.S. 511, 517 (1949).
19. 407 F.2d 228 (3d Cir. 1969).
20. Id. at 235. The trial court in Neff had charged:
If you find that... [the seaman] was not cured but suffered a condition that was
incurable as of that date, even though further medical care might be of benefit
in arresting the further progress of his disease, or in giving him relief from pain
or discomfort, he is, likewise, not entitled to recover on this claim . ...
Id.
21. Id. at 232.
22. Id. at 232-33.
23. Id. at 235.
24. 443 F.2d 565 (3d Cir. 1971).
25. Id. at 567. The action was brought by the widow of Charles Ward. As a
result of receiving steroid treatments for his arthritic condition, Ward developed an
ulcer. This condition was followed by obstructive jaundice requiring surgery. He
died of complications during that surgery. Id.
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held that the shipowner must continue to pay maintenance and cure "where
medical care is needed to arrest further progress of the disease or to relieve
pain," 26 because as long as treatment was needed for those purposes the
"maximum possible cure" had not yet been effected. 27
In Cox, the Third Circuit conceded that the district court correctly
concluded that the thrust of Neff and Ward commanded that Cox recover

cure payments. 28 The court reversed, however, holding that those cases
were contrary to Supreme Court decisions concerning the duration of
maintenance and cure payments. 29 Thus, the court denied Cox all relief3 0
and overruled Neff and Ward to the extent of such inconsistency. 31
The liberality of the Neff and Ward doctrines was peculiar to the
Third Circuit. 2 Although other circuit courts have consistently held that
shipowners are not liable for medical expenses needed to arrest further
progress of a disease or to relieve pain,83 the former Third Circuit position s4 was not necessarily contrary to prior Supreme Court holdings,85
because the Supreme Court has not addressed this issue 6 and, in fact,
expressly left this question undecided in Vella v. Ford Motor Co.8 7 In
26. Id. at 572. It is unclear from the decision whether the medical treatment
Ward received was to relieve pain, or to arrest progress of the disease, or both.
27. Id. The court in Ward felt this formulation was within the limits set by
Farrell. Id. at 572. See note 18 and accompanying text supra.
28. 517 F.2d at 623. For a discussion of the reasons why the district court denied
Cox's request for maintenance payments, see note 3 supra.
29. 517 F.2d at 623; see notes 12-18 and accompanying text supra. The Third
Circuit read Farrell and Calmar as demanding that the shipowner's liability terminate
when the disability has been declared permanent regardless of whether treatment is
needed to relieve pain or arrest the progress of a deteriorating condition. Id. at 626.
In a concurring opinion, Chief Judge Seitz argued that since the treatments Cox
received were solely for the relief of pain, the court should not have decided the issue
of treatment which can arrest the progress of a deteriorating condition. Id. at 627
(Seitz, J., concurring).
30. 517 F.2d at 627. This result is not as harsh as it might first appear since, in
addition to the maintenance and cure payments he had received, Cox already had
recovered $75,000 in his first suit against Dravo. See notes 1 and 6 supra.
31. 517 F.2d at 621.
32. 372 F. Supp. at 1006.,
33. See, e.g., Stewart v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 409 F.2d 1045 (5th Cir. 1969);
Travis v. M.V. Rapids Cities, 315 F.2d 805 (8th Cir. 1963) ; Desmond v. United States,
217 F.2d 948 (2d Cir. 1954).
34. It is interesting to note that Judge Gibbons wrote the circuit court's opinion
both in Ward and in Cox.
35. For an opinion that the Neff and Ward decisions accurately reflect the
Supreme Court's tendency to apply seamen's remedies liberally, see Comment, Should
"Maximum Cure" Be Retained As An Arbitrary Limit On Maintenance And Cure
Liability?, 5 U. SAN FRAN. L. REv. 105, 113 (1970).
36. Farrell, 336 U.S. 511 (1949), and Calmar, 303 U.S. 525 (1938), held only
that a seaman's eligibility for maintenance and cure ceases when his condition can no
longer be improved. 336 U.S. at 518; 303 U.S. at 531. Apparently, the argument
that relief of pain or control of a deteriorating condition is equivalent to an improvement of the seaman's condition was not made, since this was not discussed by the
Court in either case.
37. 421 U.S. 1, 5 n.4 (1075). The Supreme Court stated:
[I]t is not necessary to address the, question whether the jury award might also
be sustained on the ground that the shipowner's duty in any event obliged him
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Vella, the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's denial of maintenance
and cure payments to a seaman because his condition was incurable from
its incipience. 88 Instead, the Court held that the seaman was entitled to
payments at least until the malady was diagnosed as permanent.8 9 Thus,
since the Vella Court awarded the seaman all that was asked for upon
appeal, 40 it can be inferred that the Court intended to adopt a liberal interpretation of seaman's remedies. Further support for this inference can be
found in Vaughan v. Atkinson 41 in which the Court wrote:
[T]he shipowner's liability for maintenance and cure was among "the
most pervasive" of all [owner's liabilities] and . . . it is not to be

defeated by restrictive distinctions nor "narrowly confined." When
there are
ambiguities or doubts, they are resolved in favor of the
42
seaman.
The Third Circuit had not only recognized this liberal trend but also
applied it in Neff48 and Ward.4 4 Furthermore, Vella, which is the Supreme
Court's most recent consideration of seamen's remedies, gives no indication that the Supreme Court has abandoned this trend. 45 Thus, the
Third Circuit may have erred when it characterized the Neff and Ward
decisions as "patently inconsistent with the Supreme Court's pronouncements. ' 46 Overruling these decisions appears especially incongrous in light
of the Third Circuit's expressed view that
[i]t may be sound social policy that vessel and cargo be required
to insure against the cost of palliative or preventive care and for
maintenance of seamen who become permanently47 disabled or incurably ill while engaged in the service of the vessel.
The Cox decision will have little practical effect upon seamen in
similar situations, since they may claim future medical expenses in a suit
to provide palliative medical care to arrest further progress of the condition or
to reduce pain, and we intimate no view whatever upon the shipowner's duty in
that regard. Compare Ward v. Union Barge Line Corp. .

.

. with the opinion

of the Court of Appeals in this case . . . [unreported decision].
Id. (citations omitted).
38. Id. at 1383.
39. Id. at 1384.
40. Id. at 1384 n.4.
41. 369 U.S. 527 (1962). The Court held in Vaughan that a seaman's maintenance payments could not be reduced by the seaman's earning during the pertinent
period, at least where he was forced to work because mainenance had not been provided. Id. at 533.
42. Id. at 532 (citations omitted).
43. 407 F.2d at 234-35.
44. 443 F.2d at 572.
45. The Third Circuit considered Vella, in deciding Cox, but found it distinguishable on its facts. 517 F;2d at 627.
46. 517 F.2d at 627.
47. Id.
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under the Jones Act,48 without regard to whether the injury is permanent.4 9
Thus, it is possible for the ill or injured seaman to receive the equivalent

of lifetime cure payments if lifetime medical treatment is necessary.50 The
equivalent of maintenance payments could be recovered by claiming room
and board payments as lost earnings in addition to lost cash wages. 51 It
is the seaman without a basis for claiming negligence or unseaworthiness
who, as a result of Cox, will be left without recourse if he sustains a
permanent disability while in the ship's service.
In conclusion, the holding of Cox has aligned the Third Circuit with
other courts which have decided this issue. 52 It may leave some permanently
disabled seamen with no alternative except public welfare, and require
others to include medical expenses and room and board as part of their
damages in a negligence action.

Thomas Martin

Constitutional Law
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW -

DEPORTATION HEARINGS -

DENIAL OF

FAIR AND REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO OBTAIN COUNSEL VIOLATES

ALIENS' DUE PROCESS AND STATUTORY RIGHTS.

Chlomos v. Immigration & Naturalization Service (1975)
In January 1974, petitioner Chlomos, a Greek alien, was arrested
and jailed pending a deportation hearing.' Shortly after the arrest,2 the case
was called for hearing at the district office of Immigration and Naturaliza48. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970). The seaman must be able to prove negligence to
prevail. For the pertinent text of the Act, see note 1 supra.
49. NoRms, supra note 2, § 697.
50. Downie v. United States Lines Co., 359 F.2d 344, 347 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 897 (1966).
51. Id. at 347. The court wrote that the seaman is entitled to compensation for
"any . . .economic loss he -may have sustained or is likely to sustain." Id. The
seaman's shipside wages are generally somewhat lower than shoreside wages for
employees with similar duties in order to reflect the value of room and board received
on the ship. See generally NoRRis, supra note 2, § 610. Thus, it appears room and
board might be considered as part of a seaman's lost wages.
52. See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
1. Chlomos v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 516 F.2d 310, 312 (3d Cir.
1975). Petitioner, a Greek seaman, came to the United States under the authority of
a conditional permit which was issued pursuant to section 252 of the Immigration
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1282 (1970). 516 F.2d at 312. Having overstayed
the permit, petitioner was ordered in June, 1970 to leave the United States voluntarily
within 30 days. The record did not disclose whether the basis for this order was
petitioner's participation in a sham marriage, which, if valid, would have entitled
him to an immigrant visa, or his having overstayed the 29-day period of his conditional permit. 516 F.2d at 312. Having failed to voluntarily depart within the
designated period, in July, 1970, petitioner was served with an order to show cause
why he should not be deported. The order commanded his appearance for a deportation hearing on "A Date to be Fixed" at the United States Department of Justice,
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tion Service,8 at which time petitioner notified the special inquiry officer
that he wished to be represented by his lawyer.4 A 1-day continuance
was granted, but since petitioner was unable to contact his lawyer
within that time, he was afforded an additional 6 days in which to have
his attorney enter an appearance. 5 Petitioner reasserted his right to counsel when his lawyer failed to attend the rescheduled hearing, 6 but the
7
special inquiry officer, after hearing testimony, ordered petitioner deported.
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) office in New Jersey. Id. No date
was set, nor was a hearing ever held pursuant to that order. Id.
In January, 1974, petitioner, who was on probation pursuant to conviction in
New Jersey relating to his sham marriage and overstay of his permit, was arrested
in Florida for probation violation upon being recognized by an immigration officer
who had participated in the earlier New Jersey proceedings. Id.
2. Petitioner was arrested on a Friday and the hearing was set for the following
Monday. 516 F.2d at 312.
3. Id. The hearing was to take place in Florida. The special inquiry officer
warned petitioner that he would deny any motions to send the case back to New
Jersey. Id.
4. Id. An alien's right to private counsel is granted by sections 242(b) and 292
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act). Section 242(b) provides in relevant
part:
Proceedings before a special inquiry officer acting under the provisions of this
section shall be in accordance with such regulations, not inconsistent with this
chapter, as the Attorney General shall prescribe. Such regulations shall include
requirements that(2) the alien shall have the privilege of being represented (at no expense
to the Government) by such counsel, authorized to practice in such proceedings, as he shall choose ....
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1970).
Section 292 of the Act provides in relevant part:
In any exclusion or deportation proceedings before a special inquiry officer
and in any appeal proceedings before the Attorney General from any such
exclusion or deportation proceedings, the person concerned shall have the privilege
of being represented (at no expense to the Government) by such counsel,
authorized to practice in such proceedings, as he shall choose.

Id. § 1362.
5. 516 F.2d at 312.
6. Id. at 312-13. Petitioner's lawyer had telephoned the district director in
Florida and requested that the case be sent back to New Jersey where a file on
petitioner already existed. Id. at 313. The special inquiry officer, while advised that
this call had been received by the district director, nevertheless failed to make an
inquiry of the district director, and did not contact the New Jersey INS office which
had issued the earlier show cause order. Id.; see note 1 supra.
7. 516 F.2d at 313. Petitioner was deportable under section 241(a) (2) of
the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (2) (1970), both because he overstayed the 29-day
period of his conditional permit, and because he failed to leave the United States
voluntarily within the prescribed 30 days when given the opportunity in 1970. See
note 1 supra. Section 241 (a) (2) of the Act provides in relevant part:
Any alien in the United States (including an alien crewman) shall, upon the
order of the Attorney General, be deported who(2)" .. is in the United States in violation of this chapter or in violation
of any other law of the United States . . ..
8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2) (1970).
As a result of his failure to leave the United States within the period of
his conditional permit, petitioner was also deportable under section 241 (a) (9) of
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Upon reviewing the Board of Immigration Appeals' dismissal of petitioner's
appeal," the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the deportation
order and remanded the case, 9 holding that the denial of petitioner's right
to representation by private counsel violated both petitioner's constitutional
right to due process of law and his statutory right to retained counsel.
Chlomos v. Immigration & Nationalization Service, 516 F.2d 310 (3d
Cir. 1975).
The Chlomos court preserved the Third Circuit's prior position that
indigent aliens are not entitled to court-appointed counsel, 10 and its holding
that the right to representation by private counsel is both constitutionally"
and statutorily 12 mandated was consistent with other decisions relevant to
the procedural rights of aliens.'8 Courts have recognized that representation by counsel is an integral part of due process. 14 In the context of
deportation proceedings, however, this has only meant that an alien must

the Act, id. § 1251(a)(9), providing for the deportation of any alien who was
admitted as a nonimmigrant and failed to maintain the nonimmigrant status in which he
was admitted.
Moreover, because petitioner was convicted of conspiracy and of defrauding
the United States through a sham marriage in 1973, he was deportable both under
section 241(a) (4) of the Act, id. § 1251 (a) (4), which provides for deportation upon
conviction and sentencing for the commission of a crime of moral turpitude within
5 years of entry, and under section 241(a) (5) of the Act, id. § 1251(a) (5), which
provides for deportation in the case of a conviction for fraud or misuse of visas,
permits, or other entry documents.
At the same time that he ordered petitioner deported, the special inquiry
officer also denied petitioners application for voluntary departure because of statutory
ineligibility for relief. 516 F.2d at 313.
8. Section 106 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § l105a (1970), governs the procedure for
judicial review of deportation orders.
9. Judge Weis wrote the majority opinion.
10. 516 F.2d at 314. The Third Circuit last refused to recognize a right to
appointed counsel in Ah Chiu Pang v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 368 F2d
637 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1037 (1967).
11. 516 F.2d at 313. An alien subjected to deportation proceedings is entitled
to due process of law under the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution.
See The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86 (1903), in which the Supreme Court
of the United States stated:
[T]his court has never held, nor must we now be understood as holding, that
administrative officers, when executing the provisions of a statute involving the
liberty of persons, may disregard the fundamental principles that inhere in "due
process of Law" ....
Id. at 100. However, in immigration proceedings, the protection of the fifth amendment has not as yet been extended to include substantive due process of law, which
would give aliens the right to question the reasonableness of the grounds for exclusion
and deportation legislated by Congress. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580
(1952).
12. 516 F.2d at 314. For the statutory provisions governing an alien's right to
counsel, see note 4 supra.
13. See The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86 (1903); Yiu Fong Cheung
v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 418 F.2d 460 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Rose v.
Woolwine, 344 F.2d 993 (4th Cir. 1965); Van Den Berg v. Lehmann, 261 F.2d 828
(6th Cir. 1958).
14. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) ; Hyun v. Landon, 219 F.2d 404
(9th Cir. 1955), aff'd per curiam, 350 U.S. 990 (1956).
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443

be afforded a reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel. 15 Although in
certain circumstances a deportation hearing may proceed without counsel
and still satisfy the requirements of due process, 16 the reviewing court
will carefully scrutinize the totality of the circumstances in such a case
17
to ensure that the hearing was fair.
Holding that petitioner was denied due process by the special inquiry
officer's "undue curtailment" of his privilege of counsel,' 8 and that he was
prejudiced to a degree which required that the deportation order be
vacated, 19 the court did not find it necessary to consider the validity of the
doctrine of harmless error.2 0 However, it did, in dictum, express dis15. See Van Den Berg v. Lehmann, 261 F.2d 828 (6th Cir. 1958) ; Barresse v.
Ryan, 189 F. Supp. 449 (D. Conn. 1960); Hee Chan v. Pilliod, 178 F. Supp. 793
(N.D. I11.1959).
16. E.g., United States ex rel. Mustafa v. Pederson, 207 F.2d 112 (7th Cir. 1953)
(waiver of counsel) ; United States ex rel. Wlodinger v. Reimer, 103 F.2d 435
(2d Cir. 1939) (failure to procure counsel) ; Weinbrand v. Prentis, 4 F.2d 778 (6th
Cir. 1925) (failure of counsel to appear).
17. See, e.g., Van Den Berg v. Lehmann, 261 F.2d 828 (6th Cir. 1958) ; United
States ex rel. Wlodinger v. Reimer, 103 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1939) ; United States
ex rel. Ciccerelli v. Curran, 12 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1926) ; Weinbrand v. Prentis, 4 F.2d
778 (6th Cir. 1925). Where the circumstances warrant, the courts have not been
reluctant to make a finding of procedural unfairness. For example, in Barresse v.
Ryan, 189 F. Supp. 449 (D. Conn. 1960), an imprisoned alien seeking to obtain
counsel for his appeal was denied a continuance, notice of which reached him only 3
days before the appeal was to be heard. Id. at 452. Noting that the appeal was held
in the absence of counsel despite the alien's request for representation, the court held
that it was "clear" that the alien was deprived of his right to retained counsel. Id.
For comprehensive treatment of the right to counsel in immigration proceedings, see
Gordon, Right to Counsel in Immigration Proceedings,45 MINN. L. REV. 875 (1961) ;
Comment, Deportation and the Right to Counsel, 11 HAxv. INT'L L.J. 177 (1970).
18. 516 F.2d at 311. The reasons why petitioner's hearing was judged unfair
centered around the special inquiry officer's refusal to consider transferring the case
back to New Jersey. See note 3 supra. This refusal precluded consideration of
significant issues bearing on the ultimate fairness of the hearing, such as the availability of witnesses in New Jersey and the presence of petitioner's private attorney in
that state. 516 F.2d at 312 n.4. The alleged inconvenience and expense to the Government, cited by the special inquiry officer as reasons for his refusal, were found by the
Third Circuit to be unsupported by the record. Id. In view of the fact that the
deportation hearing was held far from the place where petitioner lived and where
witnesses and his attorney could be found, the court found that the special inquiry
officer failed to allow a reasonable opportunity for private counsel to be present.
Id. at 314. The court stated:
While two continuances were granted in this case, as a practical matter they
were inadequate to make the services of his chosen counsel available to petitioner.
There was no necessity for the hasty hearing by the immigration judge, and
arrangements could have been made which would have been reasonable for both
the government and petitioner's counsel.

Id.
19. 516 F.2d at 314. The court found that petitioner was actually prejudiced by
absence of counsel at his deportation hearing because several factors, which were not
developed at the hearing, could have been favorably introduced on behalf of the
petitioner. These factors included his youth, his inducement into the sham marriage
by a "con artist," and his cooperation with the prosecution relevant to his previous
criminal conviction. Id.
20. Id. The doctrine of harmless error provides that a conviction may be affirmed,
notwithstanding an error on the part of the judge, if it is established beyond a
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satisfication with that doctrine as applied to statutorily protected deporta21
tion procedures.
The Chlomos court's opinion illustrates the dilemma facing a court
which is intent upon strengthening the procedural rights of aliens while
remaining cognizant of the bounds within which that goal may be achieved.
Confronted with the United States Supreme Court's holding that a deportation proceeding is not a criminal proceeding subject to the protections
afforded by the sixth amendment, 22 the Chlomos court's refusal to require
the appointment of counsel for indigent aliens was reasonable, as well as
28
consistent with other circuits.
In light of the Third Circuit's previous approval of the doctrine of
harmless error,2 4 it is significant that the Chlomos court expressed its
current dissatisfaction with the rule, 25 even though the court was unwilling
immediately to abandon the rule, evidenced by its strained reasoning to
find actual prejudice to petitioner. 26 However, abandonment of the docreasonable doubt that the error did not prejudice the result. Yiu Fong Cheung v.
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 418 F.2d 460 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See also Gordon,
supra note 17, at 880.
21. 516 F.2d at 314, discussing Henriques v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv.,
465 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 968 (1973). While Judge Weis
"accept[ed] the holding" in Henriques that an indigent alien is not entitled to courtappointed counsel, he had "misgivings with the dictum" in that case that absent a
showing of actual prejudice resulting from the lack of counsel, a deportation hearing
would not be deemed invalid. 516 F.2d at 314.
22. Woodby v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S. 276 (1966);
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
23. See, e.g., Rosales-Caballero v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 472 F.2d
1158 (5th Cir. 1973) ; Tupacyupanqui-Marin v. Immigration & Nationalization Serv.,
447 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1971) ; Murgia-Melendrez v. Immigration & Naturalization
Serv., 407 F.2d 207 (9th Cir. 1969). Sections 242(b) and 292 of the Act, 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1252(b), 1362 (1970), specifically exclude the right of an alien to court-appointed
counsel.
24. See Vlisidis v. Holland, 245 F.2d 812 (3d Cir. 1957) ; Quilodran-Brav v. Holland, 232 F.2d 183 (3d Cir. 1956). Even where procedural rights of the alien have been
abridged, many courts have declined to overturn deportation orders where no actual
prejudice could be shown to have resulted therefrom. For example, courts have held
that no prejudice results to an alien where undisputed facts clearly formed the basis
for deportation. See Henriques v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 465 F.2d 119
(2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 968 (1973) ; Prassinos v. District Director, 193
F. Supp. 416 (N.D. Ohio 1960), aff'd mem., 289 F.2d 490 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
366 U.S. 966 (1961) ; De Bernardo v. Rogers, 254 F.2d 81 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 816 (1958). Courts have also held that no prejudice results to an alien
where originally disputed facts comprising the basis for deportation were subsequently
admitted by the alien. See Madokoro v. Del Guercio, 160 F.2d 164 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 764 (1947) ; Dengeleski ex rel. Saccardio v. Tillinghast, 65 F.2d
440 (1st Cir. 1933).
25. 516 F.2d at 314; see note 21 supra.
26. For the bases of the court's finding of actual prejudice in Chlomos, see note
19 supra. The court's reasoning that actual prejudice had occurred was strained
because, even granting that the instances of prejudice cited by the court took place,
i.e., failure to favorably develop petitioner's lack of blameworthiness relevant to his
previous criminal conviction, petitioner was indisputably deportable under sections
241(a)(2), (4), (5), and (9) of the Act. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(2), (4), (5), (9)
(1970). Since it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner was deportable
regardless of the purported error, it is also clear that the error did not prejudice
the result of the deportation hearing. See note 32 and accompanying text infra.
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trine of harmless error is arguably supported by strong policy considerations where the procedural guarantees of sections 242(b) and 29227 of
the Immigration and Nationality Act are concerned. While not technically
a criminal proceeding,28 deportation has been recognized by the courts
as a deprivation of liberty and a penalty often equivalent to banishment or
exile. 20 Since the proceedings are adversary in nature and may entail
grave consequences, deportation should demand the strictest requirements
of due process, including the right to retained counsel.a0 Thus, abandonment of the doctrine of harmless error would seem to be an effective
response to the present-day limitations of the law upon the procedural
rights of aliens. 3 '
Even in cases where deportability is clear, assistance of counsel can
be valuable, since deportation can be avoided by means other than a direct
attack upon the deportation order.3 2 Discretionary relief, including voluntary departure,3 3 adjustment of status,8 4 suspension of deportation,3 5 and
registry of lawful entry,3 6 is the most important avenue for avoiding
deportation. In addition, a lawyer can be helpful in advising the alien as
to procedures for lawful re-entry after deportation, in arranging bail, and
37
in giving advice as to where the alien ought to be deported.

27. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(b), 1362 (1970). For the text of sections 242(b) and 292
of the Act, see note 4 supra.
28. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
29. Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6 (1948) ; Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135
(1945).
30. See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945); Yiu Fong Cheung v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 418 F.2d 460 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
31. See note 22 supra.
32. The Chlomos court must have been aware of the fact that deportation can be
avoided by means other than overturning a deportation order, for the instances of
prejudice cited by the court, even though they did not prejudice the result of the
deportation hearing (see note 26 supra) were relevant to a claim for discretionary
relief. An alien may apply to the Attorney General, who has the ultimate responsibility for administration of the deportation laws, see Immigration and Nationality Act
§ 103, 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (1970), and request that he exercise the discretionary power
granted him by the Act to permit the alien to remain in the country. The Act
enumerates certain statutory prerequisites which an alien must meet before the
Attorney General is statutorily empowered to exercise his discretionary power.
Petitioner's eligibility for discretionary relief was not before the Chlomos court.
Although it is possible that he might not have met all the prerequisites for discretionary relief, his lack of blameworthiness might have overcome a failure to be
able to show good moral character, which is one prerequisite for discretionary relief.
See 2 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 7.9d(3)

(rev.

ed. 1975). Thus, had a claim for discretionary relief been before the court, petitioner
might have been harmed by the instances of prejudice cited by the Chlomos court.
See note 19 supra.
33. Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 242(b), (g), 244(e), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252
(b), (g), 1254(e) (1970).
34. Id. § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1970).
35. Id. § 244(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1970).
36. Id. § 249, 8 U.S.C. § 1259 (1970).
37. Bail is provided for in section 24 2 (a) of the Act. 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1970).
Countries to which an alien may be deported are determined pursuant to section 243
of the Act. 8 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970).
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The only procedural guarantees at stake in Chlomos were those
afforded to aliens in conjunction with administrative procedures contained
within sections 242(b) and 292 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
Presumably, therefore, any limitation upon the rule of harmless error would
only affect such proceedings.
For the present, the Third Circuit has evidenced an open mind toward
abandoning the doctrine of harmless error as applied to statutorily protected deportation procedures, a major and commendable step toward the
strengthening of the procedural rights of aliens. While the Chlomos court
found a factual basis upon which to rest a finding of actual prejudice,
it can be inferred from the opinion that the harmless error rule may be
expressly discarded in the future, should a factually similar case arise
without any evidence of actual prejudice. Presumably, the abandonment
of that rule would ensure that aliens will not involuntarily be deprived of
the benefits of representation by counsel of choice in deportation hearings.
Sheryl Reeve Kohlhoff

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

-

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS -

ADMINIS-

TRATIVE PROCEDURE PERMITTING RECOUPMENT OF OVERPAYMENT OF
SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS WITHOUT A PRIOR HEARING IS CONSTITUTIONALLY

DEFICIENT

THEMSELVES

TO RESOLUTION

WHERE

DISPUTED FACTS

BY DOCUMENTARY

Do

NOT

LEND

PROOF.

Mattern v. Weinberger (1975)
Plaintiff, a disabled widow, received an improper overpayment of OldAge, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) benefits., Five months
later, the plaintiff received a notice from the Social Security Administration district office stating that her monthly checks would be adjusted until

the overpaid amount had been recouped. 2 The plaintiff was also notified
of the recoupment procedures adopted pursuant to section 204 of the Social
Security Act (Act), 3 which requires the Secretary of Health, Education,
and Welfare (Secretary) to waive recoupment if the overpaid beneficiary was without fault in the matter, and recoupment of the overpayment would defeat the purpose of the Act or would be "against equity
1. Mattern v. Weinberger, 519 F.2d 150, 154 (3d Cir. 1975). The payment of
$1063.80 was improper because it was issued to the plaintiff during a 6-month
mandatory waiting period. See Title II of the Social Security Act § 223, 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(a)(1) (1970); id.§ 423(c) (2), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 423(c)(2) (Supp.
IV, 1974) (reducing the waiting period to 5 months).
2. 519 F.2d at 155.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 404 (1970).
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and good conscience. '4 The plaintiff requested that the Secretary waive
recoupment upon the grounds she was ill, without other income, and not
at fault.5 This request was denied,6 as was a subsequent request for reconsideration, 7 because the district office records revealed that the plaintiff
had been informed both by letter and telephone that the improperly issued
check should be returned, and therefore, plaintiff was not without fault.8
The plaintiff, maintaining that the district office's letter had been
unclear 9 and that she had never received the telephone call,10 filed a class
action suit on behalf of "all persons eligible for Social Security OASDI
benefits ...whose benefits have been or will be reduced, terminated or
otherwise summarily adjusted by defendant without notice and opportunity
for a prior administrative hearing."" The district court found that the
recoupment procedure denied the class members due process of law by
failing to provide for a hearing prior to recoupment of benefits. 12 On
4. Id. § 404(b). At the time the instant suit was filed, the regulations adopted
pursuant to section 204 of the Social Security Act (Act) required an initial cx parte
determination by the agency that there had been an overpayment and that a waiver
of the recoupment was not warranted. 20 C.F.R. § 404.905(m) (1975). The recipient of the overpayment, upon written request, was then entitled to a reconsideration
of the initial determination by the Secretary. Id. § 404.914. If upon reconsideration
the initial determination as to overpayment was affirmed, the recipient was entitled
to a full evidentiary hearing before an administrative law judge, id. § 404.917, with
a right to review by the Appeals Council of the Social Security Administration.
Id. § 404.945. Judicial review was available upon exhaustion of these administrative
remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1970). The recoupment process was tolled by a
request for reconsideration of the initial determination, but was reinitiated if the
fact of overpayment was reconfirmed. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, SOCIAL
SECURITY CLAIMS MANUAL § 5503.3 (1972).
The Mattern court inferred from the
record that there was generally a delay of several months between the date the withholding of benefits began and the time the recipient was able to obtain an oral hearing
before an administrative law judge. 519 F.2d at 154.
In July 1975, these procedures were amended in response to a decision
of the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. In
Buffington v. Weinberger, Civil No. 734-73C2 (W.D. Wash., Oct. 22, 1974), the
court held that hearings were required prior to recoupment or adjustment of social
security benefits, specifying in detail the form the hearing should take. See note 35
infra. The Social Security Administration then introduced a personal conference
between the claimant and a district office representative to take place after the
reconsideration of the initial determination if the claimant so desired. Recoupment
was deferred until the initial determination was affirmed at the conference. SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, SOCIAL SECURITY CLAIMS MANUAL § T5509 (advance
copy 1975). The claimant could waive the personal conference, however, whereupon
recoupment would begin immediately. Id. § T5510.
5. 519 F.2d at 155.
6. Id.
7. Id. For the distinction between waiver and reconsideration, see text accompanying notes 31-36 infra.
8. 519 F.2d at 155.
9. Id. at 167. The Mattern court agreed that the wording of the letter was
ambiguous and could not support a finding of fault. Id. at 167 n.34.
10. Id. at 155.
11. Mattern v. Weinberger, 377 F. Supp. 906, 915 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
12. Id. at 919.
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appeal, the Third Circuit vacated and remanded, 13 holding that in those
recoupment situations where there were disputed issues of fact which did
not lend themselves to resolution by documentary proof, a prior hearing
was constitutionally required before recoupment could begin. Mattern v.
Weinberger, 519 F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 1975).
The Mattern court, after deciding jurisdictional and class action issues
in plaintiff's favor, confronted the due process issue by first addressing the
Secretary's argument that the existing procedures under section 204 satisfied constitutional standards because they tended to establish the "probable
validity" of the Secretary's actions. The court found that although this
probable validity analysis had been utilized before by the United States
Supreme Court to justify a state's ex parte determination that a creditor
was entitled to a writ of sequestration against a debtor, 17 it was not applicable in the instant case, which involved statutory entitlements.' 8 Assuming,
arguendo, that the probable validity analysis did apply, the Mattern court
noted that the lack of a prior hearing could still not be justified in this
instance. 19 The court observed that since the probable validity of ex parte
determinations seems to depend in part upon whether there is an immediate post-deprivation hearing and whether the existing procedures are
effective in minimizing the risk of an erroneous determination,20 section
13. The opinion was written by Judge Hunter who heard the case with Judges
Gibbons and Van Dusen.
14. 519 F.2d at 155-57. The plaintiff stated several bases of jurisdiction 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331(a), 1343(4), 1346, 1361 (1970) - but the district court held
that only the federal mandamus provision, id. § 1361, afforded jurisdiction. 377
F. Supp. at 911-14. The Third Circuit affirmed this ruling without considering
the other possible bases of jurisdiction. 519 F.2d at 156.
15. 519 F.2d at 157-59. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court order,
over the Secretary's objections, defining the class to include claimants in both "waiver"
and "reconsideration" cases. Id. at 159.
16. Id. at 159-61.
17. Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974). In Mitchell the Supreme
Court emphasized the importance of determining whether the existing pre-deprivation
procedures were adequate, in the absence of a prior hearing, to establish the probable
validity of the state's issuance of a writ of sequestration of consumer goods. Id. at
609. The Court held that a pre-sequestration hearing was not constitutionally
mandated because the state's existing procedures sufficiently minimized the risk of
an erroneous sequestration of the debtor's goods, and therefore ensured the probable
validity of the state's action. Id. at 609-10.
18. 519 F.2d at 160. The Mattern court characterized Mitchell v. W. T. Grant
Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974) as a case involving a creditor's ex parte seizure of property
belonging to debtor and found that this presented different issues from those cases
such as Mattern involving termination or reduction of social welfare benefits. Id.
This reasoning has been undermined by Mathews v. Eldridge, 44 U.S.L.W. 4224
(U.S. Feb. 24, 1976), in which the probably validity analysis of MitcheYl, a debtorcreditor case, was applied to a statutory entitlement situation. See note 17 supra
and text accompanying notes 39-40 infra.
19. 519 F.2d at 160-61.
20. Id. An immediate post-deprivation hearing and effective probative procedures
were two of the factors the Supreme Court found critical in Mitchell v. W. T.
Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 609-610 (1974). See note 17 supra.
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204 did not satisfy the probable validity test for two reasons. First, section
204 operated to permit a delay of several months from the time recoupment
was initiated until the time a hearing could be obtained ;21 second, the
Secretary's initial determinations were reversed in over one-third of the
22
cases where post-recoupment hearings were obtained.
Th Mattern court next addressed an issue suggested by the Supreme
Court's opinion in Goldberg v. Kelly :23 the role of the severity of the
deprivation in determining whether a prior hearing is constitutionally
mandated. 24 The Goldberg Court, in holding that an evidentiary hearing
was necessary prior to the termination of welfare benefits, stressed the
extreme hardship which would be caused by an erroneous discontinuation
of benefits to welfare recipients, who are, by definition, "destitute." 25 In
reaching its decision, the Goldberg Court employed a balancing procedure
in which the welfare recipient's improverished state was found to outweigh
the state interests of fiscal integrity and administrative efficiency. 28 The
Mattern court felt constrained, however, by post-Goldberg Supreme Court
decisions to discount the severity of the private impact in assessing
whether a prior hearing was required, so long as that impact was more
than de minimis. 27 Since the plaintiff was both disabled and without any
other source of income, the court concluded that the withholding of any
OASDI benefits was "surely more than de minimis,"' 28 and that Supreme
29
Court precedent, therefore, required a prior hearing.
21. 519 F.2d at 161.
22. Id.
23. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
24. 519 F.2d at 161-64.

25. 397 U.S. at 264.
26. Id. at 266.
27. 519 F.2d at 164. The Mattern court apparently confused the proper role
of the private impact in the initial inquiry of whether any process is due with its
role in the inquiry of what process is due. This confusion stemmed from a misreading
of post-Goldberg Supreme Court decisions which make due process requirements
dependent upon the severity of the private impact; the court interpreted these
decisions as "requiring prior hearings wherever the impact is more than de minimis."
519 F.2d at 164, citing North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601
(1975) ; Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) ; Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) ;
and Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971). In Goss, the Supreme Court used a threepart inquiry in determining the requirements of procedural due process: first, the
liberty or property interest at stake must be identified; second, in order to determine
whether any process is due, it must be determined whether the deprivation of that
benefit results in a more than de minimis loss; and third, having identified the interest
and ascertained its loss as causing more than a de minimis injury, the competing interests must be weighed in assessing what process is due. 419 U.S. at 572-79. Thus,
Goss made it clear that the de minimis inquiry is utilized merely to establish that
some due process is required, and that the degree of the deprivation is a factor to be
weighed in formulating the specific process that is due. This reasoning was restated
in the Supreme Court's most recent decision in the area, Mathews v. Eldridge, 44
U.S.L.W. 4224 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1976) ; see text accompanying notes 37-39 infra.
28. 519 F.2d at 163.
29. Id. at 164. See cases cited in note 27 supra.
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This general requirement of a pre-recoupment hearing was limited by
the Mattern court's acceptance of the Secretary's contention that those
recoupment situations which are readily resolvable by documentary proof
do not require a prior hearing.3 0 The Secretary asserted, and the court
recognized, that the two classes of recoupment cases - reconsideration
and waiver - presented different problems. 3' The court agreed with the
Secretary that reconsideration cases are generally well suited to resolution
by documentary evidence, for usually the recipient merely denies receipt
of an overpayment or disputes the amount which the Secretary claims was
paid.8 2 Such a dispute is easily settled by production of such evidence as a
cancelled check.83 In contrast, the fact of overpayment is not disputed in a
waiver situation, but the recipient does deny fault and claims that recoupment would frustrate the purpose of the Act.3 4 Recognizing that the opportunity to appear in person may be important in such a situation for an
accurate appraisal of claimant's fault, the court stated that "the Secretary
should establish procedures which would provide for an oral hearing where
a [reconsideration] case does not hinge on documentary evidence and
where a claimant raises issues which necessitate an evaluation of his credibility."385 While the court found the reconsideration/waiver distinction
useful, it indicated that exceptions could be made in either case, "[t]he
crucial distinction [being] not whether the cases are labeled 'reconsideration' or 'waiver,' but whether they lend themselves to resolution by docu'3 6
mentary proof."
The viability of the Mattern decision has been placed in doubt by a
recent Supreme Court decision, Mathews v. Eldridge,3 T in which the
30. Id.
31. Id. at 165.

32. Id.
33. Id. at 166.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 165-66. The Third Circuit also suggested the form that the hearing
should take, emphasizing that it is to be informal, but that it must provide for: 1) an
impartial decisionmaker; 2) timely and adequate notice of reasons for recoupment;
3) opportunity for the recipient's confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses;
4) opportunity for the recipient orally to present his or her own arguments and
evidence; 5) opportunity for the recipient to retain counsel or have the informal
assistance of a friend; 6) a decisionmaker's written report stating the reasons and
evidence relied upon in reaching the decision; and 7) opportunity for all parties to
receive and challenge the report before it becomes final. Id. at 168-69.
These are substantially the same requirements delineated by the court in
Buffington v. Weinberger, Civil No. 734-73C2 (W.D. Wash., Oct. 22, 1974). See
note 4 supra. The only difference is that Buffington did not require a presentation
of the non-final report for the recipient's consideration. However, the Ninth Circuit
subsequently added a requirement that the recipient had to receive adequate notice
30 days prior to the commencement of recoupment. Elliott v. Weinberger, Civil No.
74-1611 (9th Cir., Oct. 1, 1975). This requirement is effectively the same as the
Mattern requirement concerning access to the non-final report, allowing the recipient
time to read and act upon the decision of the hearing officer. It should be noted
that the Ninth Circuit cited Mattern with approval and indicated that it concurred
in full with the decision and analysis. Id.
36. 519 F.2d at 165 n.30.
37. 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976).
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Court held that an evidentiary hearing was not required prior to ternination of social security disability benefits. 88 In reaching this decision, the
Court utilized a balancing test composed of three factors: 1) the impact
of the deprivation upon the private interest; 2) the risk of an erroneous
deprivation through existing procedures, and the probable value of additional safeguards; and 3) the Government's interest, including the fiscal
and administrative burden that a remedial procedural requirement would
impose.39 Thus, the Eldridge opinion appears to contradict some of the
assumptions made by the Mattern court. First, the Supreme Court included a probable validity analysis in determining whether a pre-termination hearing was required 40 - an analytical inquiry the Mattern court
did not find controlling or even relevant. 41 Second, the Court weighed
the severity of the impact upon the private individual in assessing the
validity of the existing administrative process 42 - a step the Third Circuit
deemed unnecessary to a determination of what process is due, so long as
the impact is not de minimis. 43 Finally, the cases viewed together apparently create an anomalous situation in which a full termination of benefits
does not require a prior hearing while a mere temporary reduction in
monthly benefits does. In short, the lesser deprivation apparently receives
the greater protection.
A careful comparison of the two cases, however, suggests that the
seemingly contradictory results can possibly be reconciled under a flexible
notion of due process. 44 Both courts made lengthy inquiries into the nature
of the proof 45 utilized by the administrative agencies in formulating their

respective decisions. The Third Circuit recognized that no prior hearing
is constitutionally mandated in those recoupment situations where the
central dispute between the recipient and the administering agency is well
adapted to resolution by documentary proof ;46 a pre-recoupment hearing
is necessary only where the recipient's veracity or credibility becomes
relevant. 47 The Supreme Court in Eldridge noted that, in most disability
cases, the decision whether to terminate benefits will turn upon "routine...
reports" made by physicians who have personally examined the disabled
worker. 48 The Court recognized that while credibility may be a factor in
some disability cases, in most it is not, and procedural due process must be
38. Id. at 910.
39. Id. at 903.
40. Id. at 907-09.
41. See notes 16-22 and accompanying text supra.
42. 96 S. Ct. at 905-07.
43. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
44. The Supreme Court has on several occasions emphasized the flexible nature
of due process protection. See 96 S. Ct. at 902, citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 481 (1972), and Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy,
367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
45. Compare 96 S. Ct. at 907-08, with 519 F.2d at 164-67.
46. 519 F.2d at 165-66.
47. Id. at 166-67.
48. 96 S. Ct. at 907, quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 404 (1971).
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tailored to the "generality of cases, not the rare exceptions. '49 Thus,
Mattern and Eldridge may be reconcilable insofar as the different administrative procedures appear justified by the different bases of proof. Arguably,
this distinction alone could preserve the vitality of Mattern.
Another important distinction between Mattern and Eldridge is the
significantly different weight each court attached to the considerations
delineated in the Eldridge balancing test. Considering the probative sufficiency of the existing administrative procedures, the Supreme Court
described those procedures which were designed to determine disability
as "elaborate," 51 and emphasized the open file aspects which permitted the
recipient to review the case against himself or herself, and to submit additional medical evidence prior to the termination decision. 52 The Third
Circuit in Mattern, however, initially believed it to be unnecessary to
review the probative worth of the ex parte recoupment procedures, and
upon reviewing them arguendo nevertheless found them to be constitutionally inadequate. 58 The Mattern court also did not consider the third
factor in the Eldridge test: the Government's interest in administrative
economy and efficiency. The Eldridge Court perceived the potential administrative burden upon the Social Security Administration if required
to grant pre-termination hearings to be "not insubstantial." 4 Pending the
hearing, ineligible recipients would continue to receive benefits which as
a practical matter might not later be recoverable. 55 Although the record on
appeal did not actually substantiate the probable additional financial cost,50
it is significant that the Supreme Court included this factor in the balancing
process while the Mattern court did not, since it tended to tip the scale in
57
the Government's favor in Eldridge.
49. 96 S. Ct. at 907.

50. See text accompanying note 39 supra. The establishment of a constitutional
balancing test always presents the potential for courts to arrive at different results
when faced with similar facts because varying weight may be attributed to the
component factors by separate courts. In Eldridge, the Supreme Court chose to
emphasize the potential administrative burden and de-emphasize the post-deprivation
reversal rate and the resulting hardship. See notes 53-55 and accompanying text infra,
and text accompanying note 42 supra. Had the Eldridge Court accepted the dissent's
view that there is presumptively a crucial need for benefits in a disability situation,
96 S.Ct. at 910 (Brennan, J., dissenting), the private impact factor would have taken
on additional weight and thus the administrative burden factor might have been
perceived as less persuasive.
51. 96 S. Ct. at 905.
52. Id. at 908.
53. 519 F.2d at 159-61. It is significant that the Mattern court emphasized a
reversal rate of over one-third via post-recoupment hearings, suggesting that the
recoupment procedures were ineffective to minimize the risk of erroneous deprivations.
Id. at 161. The Supreme Court in Eldridge, however, stated that while reversal rate
statistics were relevant they were not necessarily dispositive as to the constitutional
sufficiency of the existing procedures, and stated, in fact, that the reversal rate for
terminations of disability benefits may have been as low as 3%, depending upon the
statistical approach taken. 96 S. Ct. at 908.
54. Id. at 909.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. This is not to imply that the Mattern court would necessarily have reached
a different result had it considered the administrative burden. It is possible that this
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The effect of Eldridge on future statutory entitlement cases is unclear.
Goldberg has been qualified to the extent that it is to be regarded now as
the due process exception rather than the norm58 and its less clearly focused
balancing test5 9 would seem to have been supplanted by the three-pronged
inquiry employed in Eldridge. A careful reading of the Mattern and
Eldridge opinions suggests that the proper approach in determining the
constitutional necessity of a prior hearing is simply one of pragmatics and
flexibility; "[a]ll that is necessary is that the procedures be tailored, in
light of the decision to be made, to 'the capacities and circumstances of
those who are to be heard.' "60 It is submitted that, given this approach,
the Mattern holding retains its vitality and is not necessarily extinguished
by Eldridge.
Judith L. White

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

- DUE PROCESS CLAUSE DOES NOT MANDATE THAT PROBATIONER BE GIVEN HEARING PRIOR TO THE ExTENSION OF THE PERIOD OF PROBATION -

NEVERTHELESS,

BEFORE

EXTENDING PROBATION, DISTRICT COURTS IN THIRD CIRCUIT MUST
HEREAFTER PROVIDE PROBATIONER WITH NOTICE OF EXTENSION AND
ADVISE PROBATIONER OF RIGHT TO A HEARING

AND TO

COUNSEL.

Skipworth v. United States (1975)
Ronald Skipworth, having been found guilty of violating two federal
narcotics statutes,' was placed on probation for a period of 2 years, subject
to the terms of an order which permitted the court to reduce or extend
this period without a finding of cause. 2 Prior to the expiration of the
original period an ex parte extension of 1 year was imposed,8 and Skipadditional governmental interest would still be
as the character of the proof required, the law
determination and the potential severity of the
58. See 96 S. Ct. at 902.
59. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
60. 96 S. Ct. at 909, quoting Goldberg v.
(footnote omitted).

insufficient to outweigh such factors
rate of dependability in the ex parte
impact on the private individual.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-69 (1970)

1. Skipworth was convicted of violating the Act of Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 736, 68A
Stat. 550 (repealed 1970), and the Act of Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 551
(repealed 1970). These sections prohibited the sale of narcotics except in the original
stamped containers and pursuant to a written order form issued by the United States
Treasury. Skipworth v. United States, 508 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1975).
2. 508 F.2d at 599. The order stated:
I understand that the Court may change the conditions of probation, reduce or
extend the period of probation, and at any time during the probation period or
within the maximum probation period of five years permitted by law, may issue a
warrant and revoke probation for a violation occurring during the probation period.
Id. at 602 n.8.
3. Id. at 599.
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worth was promptly notified of both the extension and the reasons for the
court's action.4 During the extended period, he was arrested for violating
the conditions of his probation. 5 The district court, following a full hearing,
revoked probation and imposed two consecutive 5-year sentences. 6 Skipworth filed a pro se petition contesting the court's grant of the ex parte
extension. 7 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit affirmed the denial of the petition s holding that where a probationer
was immediately notified of an extension of his probation and the extension imposed no new strictures on him, the due process clause did not
require the probationer be given notice and the right to a hearing prior
to the extension, both because the loss of liberty was not grievous, and
because the probationer's input at a hearing would have been minimal.
The court did find the lack of procedural safeguards inadvisable, however,
and ordered all district courts within the circuit to provide notice of a
proposed extension and to advise a probationer of his right to a hearing,
with the assistance of counsel, before granting any further extensions.
Skipworth v. United States, 508 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1975).
In reaching its decision, the court concluded that the significant restrictions 9 entailed in an extension of probation do not constitute as "griev4. Id. at 602. The basis for the extension was the fact that during the period of
Skipworth's probation he had been arrested by the Philadelphia police seven times
for narcotics violations. At the time the extension was granted, three of the charges
were still pending; the other four had previously been disposed of by acquittal or
dismissal. Id.
5. Id. at 599.
6. Id. At the revocation hearing, Skipworth was represented by counsel. Id.
7. Skipworth claimed that rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
required his presence when the trial judge granted the extension. Id. at 600. Rule 43
provides in pertinent part:
The defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at every stage of the trial
including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the
imposition of sentence, except as otherwise provided by these rules ....
FED. R. CRIM. P. 43
In order for this argument to have merit, the court reasoned that an extension
of probation would have to be considered to be an imposition of sentence - a proposition which courts have continually rejected. 508 F.2d at 600; see, e.g., United States
v. Flutz, 482 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1973). If the initial granting of probation was not an
imposition of sentence, the court concluded that neither was an extension of that probation. 508 F.2d at 600.
Skipworth raised two additional contentions in support of his position. First,
he claimed that his conviction on two separate counts for a single incident violated the
double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment and constituted the type of pyramiding
of sentences condemned by the United States Supreme Court in Prince v. United
States, 352 U.S. 322 (1957). In Prince, the Court recognized a distinction between
a case in which the same act constitutes several crimes and one in which several
criminal statutes describe the same act. Petitioner also asserted that his conviction
for selling narcotics without having obtained an official order form violated his
privilege against self-incrimination. 508 F.2d at 600 n.2. The Skipworth court
found both of these arguments to be clearly without merit. Id.
8. After hearing the case with Judges Van Dusen and Weis, Judge Hunter
wrote the opinion.
9. While the terms of each probation order may vary significantly, they
generally reduce the fourth amendment expectations of the probationer from a required showing of probable cause, to a standard of reasonable belief, when dealing
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ous 'u ° a loss as that suffered when probation is revoked, an action for

which due process does require the protection of notice and a prior
hearing." Moreover, the factual inquiry in an extension proceeding was
12
recognized to be quite different from that in a revocation proceeding.
Revocation, at a minimum, necessitates a court's actual finding of a probation violation ;13 and the probationer's testimony may prove crucial in
contesting the allegation of a violation.' 4 In contrast, the court stated that
an extension of probation may be based upon a greater variety of considerations, and may be granted even absent a finding of an actual probation
violation. 15 Because the judge has a much greater latitude in granting an
extension of probation than in revoking that probation,' 6 the court conwith the probation officer. Additionally, probation imposes obligations upon the probationer and restricts his freedom of movement, e.g., he must report to the probation
department and assist the staff in monitoring his activities. For a comprehensive
,overview of the fourth amendment rights of parolees and probationers, see White, The
Fourth Amendment Rights of Parolees and Probationers, 31 U. PITt. L. REV. 167
(1969). For a review of other restrictions which have been placed upon probationers,
see Comment, Judicial Review of Probation Conditions, 67 COLUm. L. REV. 181 (1967).
10. The "grievous loss" standard was initially proposed by Justice Frankfurter
in his concurring opinion in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J,, concurring). This standard was later adopted by
the Court in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970). The Court has recently
phrased the test in the following manner: "Whether any procedural protections are
due depends on the extent to which an individual will be 'condemned to suffer grievous
loss.'" Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972), quoting Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Comm., supra at 168 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). But see Goss v. Lopez,
419 U.S. 565 (1975), where the Court, in holding that a public school student who
had been suspended for 10 days had property and liberty interests which were protected by the due process clause, stated: "as long as a property deprivation is not de
minimis, its gravity is irrelevant to the question whether account must be taken of
the Due Process Clause." Id. at 576.
11. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) ; cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471 (1972).
12. 508 F.2d at 602.
13. Id.
14. Id.; see Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1972).
15. 508 F.2d at 602, citing United States v. Squillante, 144 F. Supp. 494, 495
(S.D.N.Y. 1956).
16. Id. The court cited the following cases as authority for the proposition that
a trial judge has greater latitude in granting extensions: United States v. Rosner,
161 F. Supp. 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); United States v. Squillante, 144 F. Supp. 494
(S.D.N.Y. 1956) ; United States v. Squillante, 137 F. Supp. 553 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 235
F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1956); United States v. Edminston, 69 F. Supp. 382 (W.D. La.
1947). These cases, in turn, cited 18 U.S.C. §§ 3651, 3653 (1970), as the statutory
foundation for such a proposition. See, e.g., United States v. Squillante, 137 F. Supp.
'553, 554 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 235 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1956). Section 3651 provides in
-pertinent part that "the court may revoke or modify any condition of probation." Id.
§3651. Section 3653 provides in pertinent part:
When directed by the court, the probation officer shall report to the court,
with a statement of the conduct of the probationer while on probation. The court
may thereupon discharge the probationer from further supervision and may terminate proceedings against him, or may extend the probation, as shall seem advisable.
Id. § 3653.
While the Skipworth court may have been correct in its interpretation of the
statutory authority, the case law upon which it relied can be distinguished. In both
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cluded that the probationer's presence was not as crucial at the former
7
proceeding.'
The Skipworth decision deviates from a trend toward expanding the
contexts in which convicted persons will be afforded the safeguards of
procedural due process. The seminal case in this trend was the 1972
decision of Morrissey v. Brewer' s in which the Supreme Court of the
United States held that a parolee was entitled to procedural due process
before his parole could be revoked. Since Morrissey, the federal courts
have determined that the due process clause requires similar protection in
other situations in which a convicted person's interests may be adversely
affected. Thus, the protection of prior notice and hearing has been extended to the revocation of probation, 9 a prisoner's loss of good-time
credits, 20 the placement of a prisoner in punitive segregation, 21 and the
Squillante and Rosner, the probationers were represented by counsel and were present
before the court when the judges determined that they were not satisfied that the
probationers had complied with the conditions of their original orders. Both defendants were given an opportunity to persuade the court to the contrary before the
extension was granted. See 137 F. Supp. at 554; 161 F. Supp. at 235.
United States v. Edminston, 69 F. Supp. 382 (W.D. La. 1947), presents a
different factual setting. From reading the court's opinion, one can assume that the
scheme of probation in the Western District of Louisiana in the 1930's was for the
defendant to be placed on probation for a period of 1 year with the understanding
that he would come before the court each year, and if it were found from a report of
his Probation Officer that he was fulfilling his obligations in a satisfactory manner,
the court would extend the period for 1 year until he had been under supervision for
3 years. After this period he would be discharged. 69 F. Supp. at 384. However,
aside from the fact that Edminston was decided over a quarter of a century ago,
before the Supreme Court began to give the expansive interpretations of individual
rights in the 1950's, it can be distinguished from Skipworth in that the probationer
in Edminston fully expected to be subject to the authority of the probation office for
a period of 3 years from the time the original 1-year term was granted, while Skipworth only had a reasonable expectation of 2 years. Compare 69 F. Supp. at 384 with
509 F.2d at 599.
17. 508 F.2d 602.
18. 408 U.S. 471 (1972). The Morrissey Court determined that the form and the
extent of the process due had to be determined by balancing the state's interest with
the parolee's interest; it thereby concluded that the parolee was at least entitled to
a hearing with prior notice. Id. at 489.
19. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973). Relying on its previous decision in
Morrissey, the Supreme Court found that revocation of probation was constitutionally
indistinguishable from revocation of parole, and that accordingly due process required
that the probationer receive notice, and both a preliminary and final hearing, prior
to any revocation. Id. at 782. The Court failed to establish a blanket rule as to
whether counsel was required at a revocation hearing concluding, instead, that requests
for counsel must be judged on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 790.
20. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). In Wolff, the Court held that
written notice of the charges must be given to the disciplined prisoner in order to
inform him of the charges and to enable him to marshal the facts and prepare a
defense. Id. at 564. Moreover, following such notice, the Court required a period of
not less than 24 hours to elapse so that the inmate would have an opportunity to
prepare for his appearance before the adjustment committee. Id.
21. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146
(1973). The basic due process safeguards mandated by the court included: 1) adequate
advance written notice of the charges; 2) an opportunity for the prisoner to explain
his version of the incident; and 3) a trier of fact, other than the officer who reported
the infractions, in order to insure a degree of impartiality. Id. at 716. See also Adams
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interstate 22 or intrastate2 3 transfer of an inmate to a different penal institution. This seemingly unbroken line of cases indicated a constitutional
right to notice and a prior hearing at any proceeding affecting a convicted
individual's rights and liberties. With its decision in Skipworth, however, the Third Circuit 24 has imposed a limitation upon the extent to
which the constitutional protection of procedural due process may be invoked in this area of the law. However, the court did establish as a rule
within the circuit that district courts before extending probation must
provide notice to the probationer of the proposed extension and advise
him that he has a right to a hearing, together with the assistance of counsel,
25
should he so desire.
Since Skipworth was the first post-Morrissey decision by a circuit
court 26 on ex parte probation extensions, the full constitutional signifi-

cance of the decision cannot be accurately forecast.. Had the Third Circuit
found that such extensions could not be granted without procedural due
process, the initial precedential basis for a uniform rule, both as to federal 27
and state courts 28 within the circuit, would have been established. How-

v. Garlson, 488 F.2d 619 (7th Cir. 1973), in which the same circuit held that Miller
was to be retroactively applied since "the very integrity of the fact-finding process
was at stake." Id. at 627.
22. Gomes v. Travisono, 510 F.2d 537 (lst Cir. 1974). In Gomes, the court held
that the deprivations inherent in the interstate transfer of a prisoner were sufficient
to trigger the minimal due process safeguards identified in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539 (1974). For a general discussion of a prisoner's rights when he is transferred, see Millemann & Millemann, The Prisoner's Right to Stay Where He Is:
State and Federal Compacts Run Afoul of Constitutional Due Process, 3 CAPITAL
U.L. REV. 223 (1974).

23. Newkirk v. Butler, 499 F.2d 1214 (2d Cir. 1974), vacated sub nom., Preiser
v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395 (1975).
24. The Third Circuit had previously refused to find that due process required
affording a prisoner the right to cross-examine witnesses at a good-time forfeiture
hearing. Meyers v. Alldredge, 492 F.2d 296, 308 (3d Cir. 1974), noted in 20 VILL.
L. REv. 449 (1975). See also Braxton v. Carlson, 483 F.2d 933 (3d Cir. 1973)
(explanation of due process rights required during prison disciplinary proceeding);
Biagiarelli v. Sielaff, 483 F.2d 508 (3d Cir. 1973) (due process required when
prisoner placed in administrative segregation).
25. 508 F.2d at 603.
26. A district court case directly on point adopted exactly the same conclusion
as the Skipworth court. See United States v. Freeman, 160 F. Supp. 532 (D.D.C.
1957), aff'd on other grounds, 254 F.2d 352 (1958). See also Cook v. Commonwealth,
211 Va. 290, 176 S.E.2d 815 (1970).
27. See notes 24 & 25 and accompanying text supra.
28. Two states within the Third Circuit have limited or prohibited the granting
of extensions of probation. Pennsylvania's recently enacted Sentencing Code mandates
that a probationer be given a hearing prior to any extension of probation. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 1371(d) (1974). Delaware courts lack the power to extend probation
under any condition. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4334(c) (1974). The Delaware
Supreme Court interpreted the state probation statute as denying its state courts the
authority to enlarge the period of probation once imposed. Tiller v. State, 257 A.2d 385
(Del. 1969), construing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4334(c) (1974). For a discussion
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ever, by refusing to base its prohibition of the practice upon constitutional
grounds, the court effectively permitted ex parte extensions to continue in
the court systems of those two jurisdictions within the Third Circuit which
presently authorize them - New Jersey and the Virgin Islands. 29 The
result is that on facts similar to Skipworth the federal courts within the
circuit are hereby compelled to deny petitions for writs of habeas corpus 0
which are based upon an alleged denial of due process effected by the ex
parte practice of the courts of these two jurisdictions.
It is suggested that the Skipworth court was presented with a particular set of circumstances which may explain the court's reluctance to
expand the present constitutional protections. After all, the petitioner
was on notice of the court's power to extend the probation ;31 he had been
arrested seven times during the first 2 years of his probation for narcotics
violations, 3 2 offenses related in nature to his initial conviction and the
ensuing imposition of probation ;33 the extension imposed no new restrictions; and he was immediately notified of the extension and the reasons
for it.34 Indeed, the petitioner alleged only one ground for the impropriety

of the extension - its ex parte nature. 85
In light of these facts, it is not implausible to conclude that the Third
Circuit would distinguish Skipworth and find a denial of due process if a
defendant within the state court system is able to demonstrate actual
prejudice by the absence of procedural protections attendant to an ex
parte extension of probation.
Although the Third Circuit deviated from a substantial line of cases
mandating that due process be afforded to parolees and probationers, and
which, thus, would have seemingly dictated a constitutional rational in
the instant case, it did provide protection to probationers by its own
order that district courts no longer grant ex parte extensions of probation.
Harry 1.1. O'Neill
of the state law in New Jersey and the territorial courts of the Virgin Islands, see
note 29 and accompanying text infra.
29. The New Jersey Statutes provide in pertinent part:
Upon a report ... the court may, at any time, discharge a person from probation,
or may extend the probation period within the limits of the maximum period
provided by section 2A: 168-1 of this title (1-5 years).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 168-4 (1971).
The Virgin Islands Code provides in pertinent part: "The court may revoke
or modify any condition of probation, or may change the period of probation." V.I.
CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 3711 (1974). To date, no court decisions from either of these
jurisdictions have limited the ability of courts to grant ex parte extensions under these
respective statutes.
30. The federal requirements for making application for a writ of habeas corpus
on behalf of a person in state custody are provided in 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970).
31. 508 F.2d at 602; see note 2 supra and accompanying text.
32. 508 F.2d at 599.
33. Id.

34. Id. at 602.
35. Id. at 600.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
FRONTATION -

-

SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT OF CON-

REDACTED CONFESSION

-

PROSECUTOR MAY NOT

USE REDACTED CONFESSION OF A NONAPPEARING CODEFENDANT IN
SUMMARY

ARGUMENT

TO CORROBORATE

EVIDENCE

AGAINST

CON-

FESSOR'S CODEFENDANTS.

United States v. Alvarez (1975)

(J. Hernandez, Appellant)

Petitioner Jose Hernandez, along with four codefendants, was convicted in federal district court of kidnapping and conspiracy to kidnap.'

The key testimony against Hernandez was given at trial by confessed
codefendant Maria Merida, 2 but the redacted confession 3 of another codefendant, John Martinez, who did not appear as a witness, was also
introduced into evidence. 4 The trial judge repeatedly warned the jury to
consider this confession only in regard to its maker, Martinez. 5 Despite the
prosecutor's use of the confession during his summation to corroborate the

testimony of Merida,6 the district court refused Hernandez' motion for a
mistrial. 7 On appeal, petitioner contended that since Martinez did not
appear as a witness at the trial, the use of Martinez' confession violated
petitioner's right of cross-examination guaranteed by the confrontation
clause of the sixth amendment. 8 The Third Circuit affirmed the conviction, 9
holding that because the confession in its redacted form did not so much
as hint that Hernandez was involved in the crime, the confession did not
1. United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1975) (J. Hernandez, appellant). Seven defendants were named in the indictment, but two of the seven were
adjudged juvenile offenders before trial. At trial, one defendant was acquitted and
the remaining four and petitioner were convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a),
(c) (Supp. IV, 1974). United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036 (3d Cir. 1975) (J.
Martinez, appellant).
2. 519 F.2d at 1053.
3. Redaction consists of the deletion from a confession of all references to a
nonconfessing codefendant. Comment, 26 U. MIAMI L. REv. 755, 758 (1972); see
Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953); People v. Aranda, 63 Cal. 2d 518, 407 P.2d
265, 47 Cal. Rptr. 353 (1965). In order for the deletion to be effective, any statements
that could be employed against nondeclarant codefendants, once their identity is otherwise established, must be excluded. Id. at 530, 407 P.2d at 273, 47 Cal. Rptr. at
361 (1965).
The dangers inherent in the use of a redacted confession are illustrated in
Jones v. United States, 342 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1964). Although codefendants' names
were deleted in Jones, other testimony about them made it obvious that the omitted
names were theirs. Use of the confession against these codefendants was deemed inadmissible. Id. at 866-67.
4. 519 F.2d at 1053.
5. Id. at 1054.
6. Id. at 1053. For a discussion of the prosecutor's remarks, see Brief for Appellant at 11-12, United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1975).
7. 519 F.2d at 1054.
8. Brief for Appellant at 15, United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir.
1975). The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part: "In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with
the witnesses against him .... ." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
9. Judge Van Dusen wrote the opinion which was joined in by Judge Gibbons
and Judge Hunter.
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"inculpate" Hernandez, and, thus, use of the confession did not deny
Hernandez his right of confrontation.Y The court went on to find, however,
that absent unusual circumstances, the prosecutor should not be allowed,
in summation, to refer to the redacted confession to corroborate evidence
which is also being used against the confessor's codefendants. United States
v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1975) (J. Hernandez, appellant).
The issue of whether a confession, noninculpatory in and of itself of
persons other than the declarant may be employed to corroborate evidence
admitted against the confessor's codefendants rarely has been raised."
In reaching its decision, the Third Circuit turned for guidance to Bruton
v. United States'2 and United States v. Lipowitz, 13 which detailed the
constitutional requirements for the use of redacted confessions in joint
trials. In Bruton, the Supreme Court of the United States set aside
Bruton's conviction where his codefendant's oral confession, which stated
that he and Bruton had committed an armed robbery, was introduced at
trial. 1 4 The Court reached this decision despite a specific charge by the
trial judge that the codefendant's oral confession was inadmissible hearsay
as to Bruton because the codefendant had not testified at Bruton's trial. 15
Mr. Justice Brennan stated:
We hold that, because of the substantial risk that the jury, despite
instructions to the contrary, looked to the incriminating extrajudicial
statements in determining petitioner's guilt, admission of [the codefendant's] confession in this joint trial violated petitioner's right
of cross-examination secured by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment.

6

In Lipowits, the Third Circuit held that since Lipowitz' confession
contained no inculpation'" whatsoever of any codefendant, the principle of
10. For the court's ruling on the effect of the trial judge's cautionary instructions, see text accompanying note 21 infra.
11. The validity of the use of a redacted confession in a joint trial usually turns
upon whether the confession inculpates a codefendant, whereas in Alvarez the confession was admittedly noninculpatory of codefendants. See, e.g., United States v. Casino,
467 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 928 (1973); United States v.
Trudo, 449 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 926 (1972) ; United States
v. Rizzo, 418 F.2d 71 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 967 (1970); United
States v. Weston, 417 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970) ;
White v. United States, 415 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 993
(1970) ; Slawek v. United States, 413 F.2d 957 (8th Cir. 1969).
For a discussion of those cases which have considered the use of a noninculpatory confession in a joint trial, see note 31 infra.
12. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
13. 407 F.2d 597 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 946 (1969).
14. 391 U.S. at 126.
15. Id. at 125.
16. 391 U.S. at 126 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court in Bruton overruled
Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232 (1957), in which it had been held that a trial
court's instruction to disregard the confession of one defendant implicating by name
a codefendant on trial in the same proceeding sufficed to protect the codefendant.
Id. at 242-43.
17. In Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968), the Supreme Court held that the
Bruton ruling should be applied retroactively only where the confession "implicated"
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Bruton did not apply, and petitioner, therefore, was not denied his right
of confrontation.18 Since the court in the instant case found that Martinez'
confession did not inculpate Hernandez within the meaning of Bruton and
Lipowitz, 19 and that the evidence against Hernandez was in other respects
consistent and overwhelming, it concluded that the appellant's constitutional
rights had not been violated by the Martinez confession.20 In addition, in
view of the trial judge's cautionary instructions regarding the use to which
the jury could put the confession, the court found that the trial judge had
not abused his discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial. 21
Recognizing that the Supreme Court in Bruton had cautioned against
reliance solely upon limiting instructions where a substantial threat to a

defendant's right to confront adverse witnesses was involved, and desiring
to minimize the potential for prejudice arising from the use of a codefendant's confession in a joint trial, the Third Circuit announced its future
policy regarding the use of such confessions:
Absent unusual circumstances, the prosecutor should not be allowed,
in his summation, to refer to the redacted confession for purposes of
corroboration at all, where the evidence it corroborates is being used
against the confessor's co-defendants. 22
This rule goes beyond the constitutional requirements for the use of
a codefendant's noninculpatory confession as defined in Bruton and
Lipowitz, 23 by eliminating the prosecutor's ability to use the confession to

corroborate evidence which is also being used against the confessor's codefendants. 24 Although this change in policy appears to further safeguard
the rights of codefendants, several factors caution against expecting a
substantial impact from Alvarez.
The first factor is the language of the policy itself.25 The court qualified
its new rule with the phrase "absent unusual circumstances, ' 26 but failed
to specify exactly what that term was to encompass. This qualification
creates the possibility that the application of the Alvarez rule may be
a codefendant. Id. at 294. The Third Circuit in Lipowitz found that the term "impli-

cated" used in Russell was synonymous with the term "inculpating" used in Bruton.

407 F.2d at 603 n.18.

18. 407 F.2d at 603.
19. 519 F.2d at 1053-54.
20. Id. at 1053.
21. Id. at 1054.
22. Id.
23. See text accompanying notes 14-18 supra.
24. 519 F.2d at 1054.
25. In stating the new policy regarding the use of redacted confessions, the Third
Circuit, adhering strictly to the facts in Alvarez, spoke only of the prosecutor's inability to use such a confession for corroborative purposes in summation, where the
evidence it corroborates is also being used against a codefendant. Id. Because the
effect of the Alvarez rule would be virtually meaningless if limited in application solely
to final arguments, it seems likely that the holding will be extended to cover the
examination phase of a trial as well.
26. 519 F.2d at 1054.
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limited in future cases by reliance upon the existence of "unusual circumstances."
Second, the court left open the question of whether violation of this
rule will always constitute reversible error, 27 or whether in certain cases
it may be considered harmless error 28 or be deemed corrected by limiting
instructions given at the trial level. 29 Thus, while the district courts of
the Third Circuit should abide by this policy regarding the use of a co27. The Bruton court, in explaining why the admission of the codefendant's confession required reversal in that case, noted:
[T]here are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot,
follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the
defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be
ignored. Such a context is presented here, where the powerfully incriminating
extrajudicial statements of a codefendant, who stands accused side-by-side with
the defendant, are deliberately spread before the jury in a joint trial.
391 U.S. at 135-36 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
The Third Circuit in Alvarez found that the redacted confession did not
inculpate any of the confessor's codefendants, thus determining that the Bruton
rationale did not apply in Alvarez, 519 F.2d at 1053. In addition, the Third Circuit
had recognized in an earlier case that the use of a codefendant's noninculpatory confession in a joint trial did not necessarily violate the sixth amendment rights of
codefendants. United States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1972). The court
reached this decision despite the argument by the codefendants that it directly corroborated the testimony of another witness and, thus, made him more credible. Id.
at 70-71. The Addonizio court concluded:
To whatever limited extent it may have enhanced [the witness'] credibility, its
effect was greatly mitigated by extensive and relentless cross-examination which
[the witness] underwent over a period of several days. Under these circumstances, we hold that the Sixth Amendment rights of appellants were not violated.
Id. at 71 (citations omitted). If Addonizio retains any validity after Alvarez, the use
of a codefendant's noninculpatory confession in a joint trial may not automatically
require reversal, even though the confession is used to corroborate evidence also being
used against the confessor's codefendants. This does not mean, however, that the Third
Circuit in future cases cannot expand upon present constitutional requirements and
declare that violations of the Alvarez rule constitute reversible error.
28. The rule of harmless constitutional error was explained in Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). In Chapman, the Supreme Court held, inter alia,
that a rule of automatic reversal shall not apply to all federal constitutional errors
because "there may be some constitutional errors which in the setting of a particular
case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent wtih the Federal
Constitution, be deemed harmless . . . ." Id. at 21-22.
Chapman was followed by Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
There, the Supreme Court held that there were some violations of the confrontation
clause which in the context of a particular case could be declared harmless error. Id.
at 254. For application of the Chapman decision in the area of redacted confessions, see,
e.g., United States v. Nero, 433 F.2d 350 (9th Cir. 1970) ; United States v. Levinson,
405 F.2d 971 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
29. Addressing the ability to correct an error of admission of evidence through
the use of limiting instructions to the jury, the Supreme Court in Bruton observed:
Not every admission of inadmissible ... evidence can be considered to be reversible
error unavoidable through limiting instructions; instances occur in almost every
trial where inadmissible evidence creeps in, usually inadvertently. . . . It is not
unreasonable to conclude that in many such cases the jury can and will follow
the trial judge's instructions to disregard such information.
391 U.S. at 135 (citations omitted). The Third Circuit has yet to decide if limiting
instructions are capable of correcting errors in the use of redacted confessions.
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defendant's confession in a joint trial to guard against reversal, the consequences of their failure to do so remain unclear.
Finally, the likelihood that other circuit courts of appeal will adopt
a policy similar to that contained in Alvarez is small, because most courts
only inquire as to whether the constitutional requirements of Bruton have
been met.30 Those circuits which have considered the use of a noninculpatory confession of a defendant in a joint trial to corroborate evidence offered
against codefendants as well, have based their decisions upon the relative
extent of corroboration involved. 3 ' The Third Circuit will no longer permit
32
any reference to a codefendant's confession for purposes of corroboration,
and assuming its scope is not limited in future cases, such a rigid statement of policy is likely to be rejected by those courts which desire a more
flexible approach.
As it now stands, the limitation Alvarez imposes upon the use of
redacted confessions in joint trials does much to protect the constitutional
rights of codefendants. Although the ban upon prosecutorial references to
such confessions may be considered harsh,33 the decision eliminates the
need for cautionary instructions, which the Supreme Court in Bruton
found to be of little value in some cases.3 4 It is hoped that the Third Circuit will adhere to a strict reading of the Alvarez rule, and not weaken
its application by relying upon the existence of "unusual circumstances" or
the doctrine of harmless error.
Carol Ann Meehan

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - JusT COMPENSATION - COST OF
STITUTE FACILITIES Is AVAILABLE TO PRIVATE OWNERS OF

SUBNON-

PROFIT COMMUNITY FACILITIES.

United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land (1974)
The United States condemned three children's recreational camps
owned and operated on a nonprofit, nondenominational basis by the Southeastern Pennsylvania Synod of the Lutheran Church.' During pretrial pro30. See note 11 supra.
31. See, e.g., Alley v. United States, 426 F.2d 877 (8th Cir. 1970) (no prejudice

where codefendant's statements barely corroborated what the Government had already
established) ; United States v. Levinson, 405 F.2d 971 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 906 (1969) (no prejudice where the record is replete with similar and corroborative evidence) ; United States v. Bozza, 365 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1966) (admission
of confession constituted reversible error since it furnished devastating corroboration
of key testimony).
32. 519 F.2d at 1054.
33. See text accompanying notes 31 & 32 supra.
34. See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
1. United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 506 F.2d 796, 798 (3d Cir. 1974).
The condemnation arose in connection with a proposed Tocks Island recreational
area. Id.
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ceedings in an action to determine the condemnee's award, the Government
sought a ruling that the condemnee was not entitled to the cost of substitute
facilities as a proper measure of compensation. 2 The district court so ruled,
holding that this method of computing compensation was available only
to a governmental condemnee. s Upon an interlocutory appeal, 4 the Third
Circuit reversed, holding that the cost of substitute facilities was available
as a measure of just compensation to private owners of nonprofit, community facilities, in appropriate cases. United States v. 564.54 Acres of
Land, 506 F.2d 796 (3d Cir. 1974).
The fifth amendment explicitly requires the Government to pay just
compensation to condemnees for property taken under the power of eminent
domain. 5 The courts have had the burden of transforming this constitutional requirement into a serviceable method of computing a condemnee's
award. 6 As a general rule, market value is deemed to be the appropriate
measure of compensation,7 but when property has been adapted to a special
purpose uniquely suited to the needs of its owner, its value in the market
place will often fall far short of its value to the condemnee. s Recognizing
the possibility of inequities in such circumstances, the courts have developed
methods other than market valuation for computing compensation for
special purpose properties. 9 To date, however, the courts' approaches have
2. Id. The Government sought to limit evidence at trial to the fair market value
of the property as of the date of the taking or, if that measure was unavailable, to
the depreciated replacement cost of the property as improved. Id.
3. United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, Civil No. 70-240 (M.D. Pa., Jan.
15, 1974).
4. The district court certified that its order involved a controlling question of
law as to which there was a substantial ground for difference of opinion. The Third
Circuit permitted the interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970).
506 F.2d at 798.
5. The fifth amendment states in part, "nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
6. In Monongahela Navig. Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893), the
Supreme Court stated:
The legislature may determine what private property is needed for public purposes - that is a question of a political and legislative character, but when the
taking has been ordered, then the question of compensation is judicial.
Id. at 327.
7. 4 P. NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.112] (rev. 3d ed., J.
Sackman, 1975) [hereinafter cited as NICHOLS]. "Use of market value as a test in
land damage cases preceded the publication of judicial decisions in this country, so
that we find it looked upon as an established principle in the earliest reported cases." Id.
In United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1942), the Supreme Court stated:
"It is usually said that market value is what a willing buyer would pay in cash to a
willing seller." Id. at 374. See Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United
States, 409 U.S. 470, 474 (1973). For a general discussion of what constitutes market
value, see NICHOLS, supra, § 12.2; L. ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 62-68 (1936).
8. NICHOLS, supra note 7, § 12.3211]; L. ORGEL, supra note 7, at 114-15.
9. As the instant court pointed out, for certain single purpose profitmaking
facilities, the proper approach may be to compute compensation based upon the present
value of capitalized future earnings. 506 F.2d at 799. See United States v. Certain
Interests in Property, 186 F. Supp. 167 (N.D. Cal. 1960), af'd on other grounds sub
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been devoid of any uniformity in valuing privately owned, nonprofit community facilities.' 0
On the other hand, according to a well-developed doctrine, a governmental condemnee is entitled to the cost of substitute facilities', rather
than the market value of its property.' 2 Only by this method, it is believed,
can the community be assured of its ability to continue the functions served
by the condemned facility.13 Prior to 564.54 Acres, those federal cases
which had applied the substitute facilities standard had all involved governnora. Likins-Foster Monterey Corp. v. United States, 308 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1962).
See generally NICHOLS, supra note 7, § 12.312[3].
Where market value is unavailable and the capitalized future earnings
approach is inapplicable, the court may admit evidence of depreciated reproduction cost.
See United States v. Benning Hous. Corp., 276 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1960). See
generally NICHOLS, supra note 7, § 12.32 [31 [bI; Level, Evaluation of Special Purpose
Propertiesin Condemnation Proceedings, 3 URBAN LAW. 428 (1971).
10. In the only federal appellate case found to have considered the point, the
Seventh Circuit, after holding that the Government must pay a church the amount
agreed upon by the parties prior to condemnation proceedings, stated by way of dicta:
"In the case of non-profit, religious or service properties, cost of replacement is regarded as cogent evidence of value although not in itself the only standard of compensation." United States v. Two Acres of Land, 144 F.2d 207, 209 (7th Cir. 1944),
appeal dismissed, 324 U.S. 884 (1945).
In general, state courts nominally have retained the concept of market value
but have been liberal in admitting evidence of any special use which affects that
market value. See, e.g., Idaho-W. Ry. v. Columbia Conference, 20 Idaho 568, 119
P. 60 (1911). In one case, cited by the court in 564.54 Acres, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts held that in assessing damages to a Girl Scout camp rendered
useless by the condemnation of a portion of its property, the market value should have
been determined by reference to its value for the special use to which it was put.
Newton Girl Scout Council v. Massachusetts Tpk. Auth., 335 Mass. 189, 138 N.E.2d
769 (1956). In discussing the assessment of that special market value, the court said:
The properties may be of a type, not frequently bought or sold, but usually
acquired by their owners and developed from the ground up, so that the cost of
land plus the reproduction cost (less depreciation where appropriate) of improvements may be more relevant than in the ordinary case.
Id. at 195, 138 N.E.2d at 773. For a general discussion of other state court approaches,
see L. ORGEL, supra note 7, at 122-27.
11. 506 F.2d at 800. The court in 564.54 Acres did provide a functional definition
of the substitute facilities doctrine: "Simply stated this method insures that sufficient
damages will be awarded to finance a replacement for the condemned facility." Id.
It is important that the concept of substitution be distinguished from that of depreciated replacement. In substitution, "[e]xact duplication is not essential; the substitute
need only be functionally equivalent." United States v. Certain Property, 403 F.2d
800, 804 (2d Cir. 1968). In the depreciated replacement or reproduction approach, the
emphasis is upon the physical structure rather than upon its function. See generally
NICHOLS, supra note 7, § 12.32[3][b]; L. ORGEL, supra note 7, at 604-06.
12. For cases in which the cost of substitute facilities was awarded, see United
States v. Certain Property, 403 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1968) (public bath and recreation
building); United States v. Certain Land, 346 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1965) (school playground); United States v. Board of Educ., 253 F.2d 760 (4th Cir. 1958) (school
premises); United States v. Certain Lands, 246 F.2d 823 (3d Cir. 1957) (highway) ;
Clarksville v. United States, 198 F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 927
(1953) (sewer lines); United States v. Arkansas, 164 F.2d 943 (8th Cir. 1947)
(bridge) ; United States v. Wheeler Twp., 66 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1933) (highway) ;
Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 143 (1971) ; Note, Just Compensation and the Public Condemnee,
75 YALE L.J. 1053 (1966).
13. See text accompanying note 35 infra.
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mental condemnees, 14 and no appellate court had considered whether such
measure of compensation should be available to a nongovernmental condemnee. 15
The instant court laid the groundwork for such an extension of the
law by reviewing the justification for the substitute facilities doctrine as
applied to governmental entities. Stating the view that the underlying
principle of just compensation is one of indemnity, 6 it rejected various other
formulas for failing to arrive at that requisite degree of compensation in this
7

case.1

The court concluded:
Fair indemnification in such circumstances [when publicly owned
facilities are condemned] requires compensation sufficient to provide
a substitution for the unique facilities so that the functions carried
out by or on behalf of members of the community may be continued.' 8
The court next refuted the Government's contention that a governmental entity is only entitled to the cost of substitute facilities if it is legally
obligated to replace a condemned facility ;19 such a rule, it was said, would
allow the measure of just compensation to vary with local law. 20 Following
the Second Circuit's discretionary approach, 21 the court adopted the view

14. 506 F.2d at 800 & n.2.
15. Id. at 800.
16. Id. at 799, citing Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934). See also
United States ex rel. TVA v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 280 (1943).
17. 506 F.2d at 799-800. The court rejected market value, capitalized future
earnings, and depreciated replacement cost as inappropriate measures of compensation. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 800. The court cited, as supportive of the condemnor's position, United
States v. Wheeler Twp., 66 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1933). In that case, the federal government caused increased flooding of the township's roads by raising the level of a lake.
Part of the court's rationale for holding that just compensation to the township
necessarily included the added cost of providing roads under the more difficult conditions, was the fact that the Government had a legal obligation to maintain the roads.
Id. at 985. In light of this obligation, the township's taxpayers had a valuable and
compensable right to be free from the burden, via taxes, of constructing and maintaining a substitute way. Id. See Bedford v. United States, 23 F.2d 453 (1st Cir. 1927).
The court in 564.54 Acres also found support for the Government's position in
United States v. Certain Lands, 246 F.2d 823 (3d Cir. 1957), in which the Third
Circuit held that where a highway was "necessary," the town was entitled to the cost
of a substitute highway, plus interest. Id. at 826. However, there was no indication in the case that the town was under any legal obligation to replace the condemned highway.
20. 506 F.2d at 800.
21. See United States v. Certain Property, 403 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1968). In this
case, the Second Circuit rejected the "legal necessity" test, stating:
If application of the "substitute facilities" theory depended on finding a statutory
requirement, innumerable nonlegal obligations to service the community would be
ignored ....
We hold, therefore, that if the structure is reasonably necessary for
the public welfare, compensation is measured not in terms of "value" but by the
loss to the community occasioned by the condemnation.
Id. at 804.
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that a condemnee is entitled to the cost of substitute facilities when the
condemned structure is found to be reasonably necessary to the public
22
welfare.
Finally, with respect to the key issue in 564.54 Acres, 28 the Third
Circuit refused to distinguish between public and private owners of community facilities for the purpose of just compensation. In light of the fifth
amendment's express protection of private property, 24 the court found it
inconceivable that the amendment was intended to impose a "greater
obligation of indemnification" upon the federal government toward the
states than toward private owners.2 5 It advanced and then refuted the
contention that the amendment should only be construed as protecting
private property, concluding instead that judicial interpretations have long
since determined that, at least with respect to publicly owned facilities,
it is the value of the property to the community that is protected. 28 Accepting this interpretation of the taking clause, the court could find no basis for
distinguishing between governmental and private owners of community
facilities.27 Moreover, if private owners were entitled to a lesser measure
of compensation, the court continued, the government might be lead by
financial considerations into discriminatory choice-of-location decisions, con28
demning, for example, a parochial rather than a public school.

The court found further support for its decision in Brown v. United
States,2 9 in which the Supreme Court approved the cost of substitute
facilities as the appropriate method of compensation, without making any
distinction, regarding its applicability, between public and private land80
owners.
It is doubtful, however, that Brown is sufficient authority to support
the holding in 564.45 Acres. The condemnee in Brown attacked the constitutionality of a statute, claiming that it authorized the taking of private
property from one citizen to sell to another so that the property was not
taken for a public purpose, as required by the fifth amendment.8 ' In
meeting this argument, the Brown Court held that the town was a unit an aggregate of private landowners, together forming a public entity - and
that the private property was thus being taken for public use.82 The Court
22. 506 F.2d at 800.
23. See text accompanying notes 14 & 15 supra.
24. See note 5 supra.
25. 506 F.2d at 801.
26. Id.; see note 35 and accompanying text infra.
27. 506 F.2d at 801.
28. Id.
29. 263 U.S. 78 (1923).
30. 506 F.2d at 801-02, citing 263 U.S. 82-83.
31. 263 U.S. at 81.
32. Id. at 82. The instant court quoted the following passage from Brown:
A town is a business center. It is a unit. If three-quarters of it is to be destroyed by appropriating it to an exclusive use like a reservoir, all property
owners, both those ousted and those in the remaining quarter, as well as the
State, whose subordinate agency of government is the municipality, are injured.
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did not distinguish between public and private facilities for the purposes
of compensation, for to do so would destroy its characterization of the town
as a single, publicly owned facility. 3
It seems, then, that the justification for the court's extension of the
substitute facilities doctrine to private owners of nonprofit community
facilities must rest upon the rationale underlying cases dealing with pub-

licly owned facilities. These cases evidence a distinct metamorphosis in
legal reasoning. Originally, the courts characterized the maintenance of a
publicly owned facility as a legally enforceable obligation of the governmental owner. The freedom from the burden of providing a substitution
for such a facility was therefore considered a valuable property right of
the governmental entity. 84 Compensation for taking that property right,

i.e., causing the loss of that freedom, was then equal to the cost incurred
by the government performing the newly acquired obligation, i.e., the cost
of erecting a substitute facility. In the later cases the courts shifted their
focus, and recognized that, although the municipality would receive the condemnation award, it was the community and its use of the facility that was
being compensated, rather than the governmental entity that maintained the
8
facility for the community's benefit.

5

This latter approach was consistent with the Supreme Court's reasoning in Brown, which implicitly recognized that the compensable injury
suffered by the town as an entity lay in its impaired ability to function for
the benefit of the community as a business center.8 6 Accepting this approach,
564.54 Acres is a logical extension of the substitute facilities doctrine. The
public or private status of the proprietor of a nonprofit community facility
is irrelevant, because the community's loss of its use of the condemned
facility is the same in either case.
Despite the logic in this decision, it is unfortunate that the Third Circuit
failed to note an important distinction between governmental and private
charitable facilities. A governmental decision to construct a public facility
A method of compensation by substitution would seem to be the best means of
making the parties whole.
506 F.2d at 801-02, quoting 263 U.S. at 82-83.
33. Dicta in Brown, which approves the substitution method, may be viewed, however, as placing the imprimatur of the Supreme Court upon the substitute facilities
doctrine, at least insofar as governmental condemnees are concerned. See note 32 Supra.
34. See note 19 supra.
35. See United States v. Certain Property, 403 F.2d 800, 804 (2d Cir. 1968)
Clarksville v. United States, 198 F.2d 238, 242-43 (4th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344
U.S. 927 (1953); Jefferson County v. TVA, 146 F.2d 564, 565 (6th Cir. 1945),
cert. denied, 324 U.S. 871 (1945). But cf. Mitchell v. United States, 267 U.S. 341
(1925), in which the Supreme Court held that in the context of private ownership,
profits lost due to destruction of a going business were not compensable except insofar as the existence of the business enhanced the special value of the land and its
appurtenances. This would seem to imply that the owner's use of the property, here
as a profit making venture, was not compensable. The former cases, however, are
distinguishable in that it was the communities' uses which were being compensated,
not, as in Mitchell, the proprietor's use.
36. See note 32 supra.
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theoretically represents the will of the entire community as expressed
through the acts of elected officialsY7 A private charitable facility, on the
other hand, may represent no more than the unilateral interest of its owner.
Its use, while potentially available to the entire community, may actually
be limited to satisfying only the personal whim of its benefactor A s The
court may have intended to deny the substitute facilities measure to owners
of facilities which are of dubious interest to the community, however, by a
qualification placed upon its holding that this measure will only be available
"in appropriate cases." 39 Whether or not that was the intent of this unclear
language, the facts of 564.54 Acres presented an easy case, as the condemned
40
facility was a true "community" facility.
Additional questions remain concerning the breadth of applicability of
the substitute facilities doctrine. First, as discussed above, it will be
necessary for subsequent courts to formulate a test to determine whether the
community's interest in the facility is sufficient to entitle the private owner
to the cost of substitute facilities. 41 A distinct, but closely related question
is whether the presence of a restriction upon the class of persons permitted
to use the facility will preclude the application of the more generous measure
of compensation upon condemnation. 42 Here again, the words "in appropriate cases" may have been intended to inform the lower courts that this
is a relevant inquiry.
Second, because the rationale for the decision in 564.54 Acres was one
of indemnification of the community of users, rather than of the individual
owner, it would seem mandatory that the substitute facility actually be built
with the proceeds of the compensation award. 43 The court failed to speci37. See J.

The Second Treatise on Civil Government, in ON POLITICS
123-24 (H. Penniman ed. 1947).
38. For example, a private library, operated on a nonprofit basis and held open to
all members of the community, appears to fall within the scope of the court's holding.
If, however, the library contained only works expounding a particular political or
religious philosophy, it is doubtful that the greater measure of compensation would
be appropriate.
39. 506 F.2d at 802.
40. Id. at 798. The condemnee alleged that the condemned camps were operated
on a nonprofit basia "for the promotion of the physical, moral and religious health and
education annually of thousands of children and youth of all races and religions in
the Eastern Pennsylvania community," and that "provision is made annually to
serve hundreds of children with special needs, whether mental, physical or financial."
Brief for Appellant at 5. One may conclude that this function is of sufficient interest
to the entire community as to warrant compensation sufficient to provide a replacement
of the condemned facility.
41. Perhaps the appropriate test would be an adaptation of the "reasonable
necessity" test. See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
42. For example, a campground that serves only children of a certain age group
presumably would be an "appropriate" facility, whereas one that serves only children
of a particular religious affiliation would not.
43. For the view that governmental entities must actually spend their awards
to build new facilities, see Note, Just Compensation and the Public Condemnee, 75
YALE L.J. 1053, 1058 (1966). But cf. United States v. Certain Lands, 246 F.2d 823
(3d Cir. 1957), wherein the court awarded the cost of substitute facilities, plus interest
from the date of the taking, even though new facilities had not yet been built. Id.
at 826. This award of interest represents compensation to the local government for
LOCKE,

AND EDUCATION
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fically address this issue, however, so its resolution must await another
case.
Finally, it is unclear whether, in future cases, the added benefit enjoyed
by the condemnee from receipt of a modern new facility must be deducted
44
Although
from the amount the condemnor would otherwise have to pay.

it might be inferred from the court's discussion that such a setoff was not
intended, 45 the court did not explicitly preclude this deduction. 46 However,
fairness to the condemnor would seem to require that it not be compelled to
7
pay costs beyond those actually caused by the condemnation.4
However these residual issues are resolved, 564.54 Acres represents
a significant step in advancing the law of just compensation. In light of
the tendency of other courts to liberalize the admissibility of evidence in
order to establish value 48 and to loosen the requirements that entitle a
condemnee to the cost of substitute facilities, 49 it is likely that the instant
decision will be followed by other circuits in future condemnation cases.
Martin Silfen

that period of time during which it neglected to provide its community with a subsitute facility. Moreover, the court failed to stipulate that such a facility must be
built. This may indicate that the Third Circuit did not consider actual replacement of
the facility to be necessary. Its approach might be different, however, where the condemnee is a private owner and there is no identity between the condemnee and the
community served by the facility.
44. A number of courts have required a setoff corresponding to depreciation
of the condemned facility be deducted from the award of compensation. See United
States v. Certain Property, 403 F.2d 800, 804 & n.11 (2d Cir. 1968). Other courts
have awarded the full cost of substitute facilities without any setoff for depreciation.
See Wichita v. Unified School Dist. No. 259, 201 Kan. 110, 439 P.2d 162 (1968).
45. 506 F.2d at 799. In rejecting depreciated replacement cost as the fair measure
of compensation in this case, the court was not necessarily rejecting depreciation as
such. It simply may have been rejecting that component of the method that requires
the award to be based upon reproduction cost of the physical, rather than functional,
equivalent of the property. See note 11 supra.
46. In 564.54 Acres, the appellant did not seek compensation for the cost of reproducing the camp buildings as they existed on the condemned land. With regard to the
buildings, it sought compensation only for additional expenses mandated by newly
enacted environmental and safety legislation, from which its old buildings were
exempt. Brief for the Appellant at 6-8. Therefore, the question of a setoff for depreciation of the existing structures never arose.
47. If, for example, the condemnee in 564.54 Acres had sought compensation for
the cost of reproducing its buildings, and if the older buildings had a remaining life
expectancy of 10 years, and the proposed new buildings had a life expectancy of 50
years, the condemnor should not be compelled to pay the cost allocable to the 40-year

difference. A suggested procedure is to deduct from the reproduction cost of the
buildings a percentage representing the added life expectancy of the buildings. In
the example, that would be a reduction of 40/50, or 80%. See United States v.
Certain Property, 403 F.2d 800, 804 n.11 (2d Cir. 1968).
48. See, e.g., Newton Girl Scout Council v. Massachusetts Tpk. Auth., 335
Mass. 189, 138 N.E.2d 769 (1956). See also note 10 supra.
49. See, e.g., United States v. Certain Property, 403 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1968).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

-

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE -

A MATERIAL

OR SUBSTANTIAL AMENDMENT TO AN INDICTMENT IS IMPERMISSIBLE
REGARDLESS OF WHETHER INDICTMENT IS CONSTITUTIONALLY
REQUIRED.

United States v. Goldstein (1974)
Petitioner, Louis Goldstein, was indicted by a grand jury for, inter
alia, the misdemeanor of willful failure to timely file his 1965 federal
income tax return.' The indictment alleged petitioner had a duty to file
his return on April 15, 1966.2 The evidence at trial revealed that on that
date, petitioner had in fact filed a Form 2688 requesting an extension of
time.3 This form was returned to Goldstein as incomplete 4 on April 27,
1966, bearing a notation that resubmission within 10 days was permissible. 5
Since petitioner failed to resubmit the form the district court found that
under the regulations then applicable, 6 the return became due at the end
of the 10-day period, May 7, 1966. 7 The trial judge's instruction to the
jury that the defendant's state of mind during the period of time leading
up to May 7, 1966, was material,8 in effect, allowed an amendment 9 to the
indictment. Cognizant that an indictment is not constitutionally required
1. United States v. Goldstein, 502 F.2d 526, 527-28 (3d Cir. 1974). Petitioner
was also indicted on two felony counts charging that he filed false returns for the
years 1964 and 1966, in violation of section 7206(1) of the Internal Revenue Code.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7206(1). Both counts carried prison terms in excess of 1
year, thus requiring the issuance of an indictment before petitioner could be charged
with the crimes. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(a). For the text of the rule, see note 10 infra.
The petit jury found him not guilty on these two counts. 502 F.2d at 527. For a
discussion of the third misdemeanor count, see note 10 infra.
It is not unusual to present a grand jury with a misdemeanor charge when
the same defendant is simultaneously charged with a felony, and the prosecution wishes
to join both charges in one indictment. 8 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
7.02, at 7-7
(2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as MOORE].
2. 502 F.2d at 528.
3. Id. Form 2688 is filed by an individual to request an extension. United States
v. Goldstein, 386 F. Supp. 833, 836 (D. Del. 1973).
4. 502 F.2d at 528. Petitioner's request for an extension was rejected because
his social security number had not been included. Id.
5. Id.
6. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6081; Treas. Reg. § 1.6081-1 (1959); and Rev.
Rul. 62-214, 1964-2 CuM. BULL. 472. These are reproduced in 386 F. Supp. at 836, 843.
7. 386 F. Supp. at 838-39. The district court so concluded only after a careful
review of the statutes and regulations in effect in 1966. See id. Thus, whether the
grand jury would have found that petitioner willfully failed to file his return by that
later date was, in the Third Circuit's opinion, far from clear for "[wlhile the due
date of April 15 is well-known to the general public, the same cannot be said of the
time for filing the return after rejection of a request for extension." 502 F.2d at 529-30.
8. 386 F. Supp. at 837.
9. 502 F.2d at 528. The amendment attempted to correct what the Third Circuit
termed a "material variation" beween the charge as alleged in the indictment, failure
to file by April 15, and that as proven at trial, failure to file by May 7. Id. For a

definition of amendment, see note 28 supra.
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for a misdemeanor charge, 10 the district court, pursuant to its express
statutory authority" to amend an information12 before the verdict is
reached, found that the amendment was permissible in this case.' 3 The
Third Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed,'1 4 holding that the indictment could
not be amended to correct a material variation between that which was
alleged and that which was subsequently proven, notwithstanding the fact
that the prosecution originally could have been commenced by the filing
of an information. United States v. Goldstein, 502 F.2d 526 (3d Cir.
1974).
The issue of whether a misdemeanor indictment may be constructively
amended was a question of first impression in the Third Circuit. 15 While
rule 7(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly allows
amendments to informations, the Goldstein court noted that it makes no
similar provision with regard to indictments. 16 Although the Third Circuit
acknowledged that this offense could have been prosecuted by an information, 1 7 and that informations are amendable unless substantial rights of the
10. 386 F. Supp. at 841. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides in pertinent part: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury ...."
U.S. CONST. amend. V. Since the failure to timely file an income tax return is not a
capital or infamous crime, an indictment was not constitutionally required.
It is also clear that an indictment was not statutorily required in this case.
Rule 7(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states in pertinent part: "An
offense which may be punished by imprisonment for a term exceding one year . ..
shall be prosecuted by indictment .... Any other offense may be prosecuted by in-

dictment or information." FED.R. CRIM. P. 7(a). Petitioner was charged with violating section 7203 of the Internal Revenue Code, which provides that violations are
punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000.00 and/or imprisonment of not more than
1 year. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7203. Since the maximum length of imprisonment
which petitioner faced did not exceed 1 year, the use of an indictment was not statutorily compelled.
11. Rule 7(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that "[t]he
Court may permit an information to be amended at any time before verdict or finding
if no additional or different offense is charged and if substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced:" FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(e). See also United States v.
Blanchard, 495 F.2d 1329 (1st Cir. 1974) (amendment made sua sponte by trial judge
upheld) ; Muncy v. United States, 289 F. 780 (4th Cir. 1923) (amendment made after
defendant's plea entered upheld).
12. An information differs from an indictment in a federal prosecution in that the
former is an official act filed under the oath or certificate of the United States attorney,
while the latter is returned under oath by a grand jury. Unied States v. Smith, 107 F.
Supp. 839 (M.D. Pa. 1952).
13. 386 F. Supp. at 841-43.
14. Judge Weis wrote the majority opinion. Chief Judge Seitz and Judge Van
Dusen joined in Judge Hunter's dissenting opinion.
15. 502 F,2d at 527.
16. Id. at 531. For the:text of the rule, see note 11 supra. Since usually only
material or substantial changes to an indictment are impermissible, the Third Circuit
had to ascertain whether the facts of the instant case involved a material amendment.
502 F.2d at 528. Although a mere change in dates is ordinarily not considered to be
a substantial variation in an indictment, the court recognized that an exception exists
when a particular day is made material by the statute creating the offense, Id.; see
note 26 infra.
17. 502 F.2d at 530; see note 10 and accompanying text supra.
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defendant are prejudiced,' 8 the court refused to extend to indictments the
amendment power granted in rule 7(e), thereby implicitly rejecting any
distinction resting upon whether the indictment was constitutionally required.19 Following the principle of statutory construction which stipulates that when the rights of an accused in a criminal proceeding are at
stake any doubts as to a statute's meaning should be resolved in favor
of the defendant, 20 the court concluded it would simply "follow the rule
as it reads."' 2 1 Since the Government realized certain benefits from the
use of the indictment process, 22 the court also reasoned that fair dealing
2
required it to assume the burdens as well as the benefits of that process. 3
Finally, finding that a defendant is disadvantaged when an amendment to
his indictment is allowed, the majority rejected the district court's finding
of harmless error under rule 52(a) 24 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. 25 Instead, the Goldstein court adopted the rule that any indictment, whether or not constitutionally required, may be amended in
substance only by the grand jury which issued the indictment. 26
18. 502 F.2d at 531; see note 11 supra.
19. 502 F.2d at 531.
20. Id. See, e.g., Hall, Strict or Liberal Construction of Penal Statutes, 48 HARV.
L. REV. 748 (1935).
21. 502 F.2d at 531.
22. Id. The court cited two advantages which the Government receives from
use of the indictment process. The first advantage is the benefit of discovery which is
gained through the use of process available to compel witnesses to appear before the
grand jury. Second, the court maintained that in the trial court there is a subtle,
though undeniable, stigma attached to a defendant who has been indicted by an impartial grand jury. Id. For a discussion of these advantages, see 43 FORDHAM L. REV.
648, 652 & n.32 (1975). See also MOORE, supra note 1, ff 7.02, at 7-7 n.10.
23. 502 F.2d at 531.
24. Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states: "Any error,
defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a).
The principle of harmless constitutional error was explained by the United
States Supreme Court in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). There, the
Court held, inter alia, that a rule of automatic reversal should not apply to all federal
constitutional errors because "there may be some constitutional errors which in the
setting of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless." Id. at 21-22.
Among those constitutional rights which are protected by the indictment
process, and which may be lost if an error is committed, are the right of the defendant
to be apprised of the charge against him, U.S. CONST. amend. VI, and the right to be
free from double jeopardy. Id. amend. V. The Third Circuit found that the notice
and protective functions of the sixth and fifth amendments respectively, had been
served in Goldstein. 502 F.2d at 529. The court also recognized a third purpose for
the indictment stage of a criminal prosecution in:
[Tihe duty of the grand jury to shield a citizen from unfounded charges and to
require him to appear in court in defense, only if probable cause has been found
by that independent body.
Id. It is this guarantee which the majority found had not been honored in Goldstein.
25. 502 F.2d at 531. The majority never fully addressed the issue of harmless
error. For the dissent's view on prejudice to the defendant, see text accompanying
note 30 infra.
26. 502 F.2d at 531. The court did recognize that changes in indictments amounting to matters of mere form, rather than matters of substance, are permissible. Id. at
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The dissent, on the other hand, reasoned that where a defendant has
no constitutional right to be charged by a grand jury,27 his conviction
should be reversed only if "the constructive amendment to the indictment
substantially affected his right to a fair trial."'28 Additionally, an examination of the wording and history of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
disclosed to the dissent no statutory barrier to such a conclusion.2 9 Applying this principal to the facts of Goldstein, the dissent after balancing any
prejudice to the defendant resulting from the amendment against the weight
of the evidence of his guilt, considered this to be an appropriate case for
exercise of the harmless error provision of rule 52 (a).30
The conclusion of the Third Circuit in Goldstein appears to be neither
constitutionally, nor statutorily required. Furthermore, the reasoning used
to support the court's belief is subject to question.3 1 While identifying
three functions an indictment serves,32 the majority conceded that the
defendant "does not and cannot claim prejudice" upon the basis of two of
them, the notice and double jeopardy functions.33 Moreover, as noted in
528, citing MOORE, supra note 1, J 7.05(1), at 7-24; see, e.g., United States v. Buble,
440 F.2d 405 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 828 (1971) (trial court's correction
of clearly erroneous dates in indictment upheld) ; Stewart v. United States, 395 F.2d
484 (8th Cir. 1968) (trial court's correction of typographical error in dates alleged
in indictment upheld). But see Carney v. United States, 163 F.2d 784 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 824 (1947) (trial court's amendment with counsel's consent changing indictment's description of allegedly counterfeit coupons held reversible error).
For a discussion of the rationale for differentiating between indictments and
informations regarding the ability to amend, see Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749,
770-71 (1962); Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 6-10, 13 (1887); Note, Indictment Sufficiency, 70 COLUM. L. Rav. 876, 882 n.62 (1970).
27. 502 F.2d at 533 (Hunter, J., dissenting). Judge Hunter asserted that the
indictment's function to prevent charges being levied upon less than probable cause did
not pertain to an indictment which is not constitutionally required. Id. at 532; see
note 24 supra.
28. Id. at 534. While the dissent's term of "constructive amendment" is not supported by precedent, a similar analysis has been adopted by the District of Columbia
Circuit. That circuit has noted the following distinction between an amendment and
a variance, the latter which is constitutionally permissible.
An amendment to an indictment occurs when the charging terms of the indictment are altered either literally or in effect, by the prosecutor or court after the
grand jury has last passed upon them. A variance occurs when the charging terms
of the indictment remain unaltered, but the evidence offered at trial proves facts
materially different from those alleged in the indictment.
Gaither v. United States, 413 F.2d 1061, 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (citations omitted).
By including the words "in effect" in its definition of amendment and citing to Stirone
v. United States, 361 U.S. 212 (1960), the facts of which essentially fall within the
definition of a variance, the Gaither court described the situation which the Goldstein
dissent termed a "constructive amendment." 502 F.2d at 533 (Hunter, J., dissenting).
Thus, although the difference in dates which existed in Goldstein was technically a
variance and not a true amendment, the dissent had support.
29. 502 F.2d at 533-34. The dissenters adopted the trial court's view that rule
7(e) deferred to case law. They thus drew no negative inference from the rule, as did
the majority (see text accompanying note 19 supra), that would ultimately bar all
amendments of substance to indictments. 502 F.2d at 533-34.
30. 502 F.2d at 534.
31. See generally 43 FORDHAm L. Rav. 648 (1975).
32. See note 24 supra.
33. 502 F.2d at 529.
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the dissent, an indictment's third function, the shielding of a citizen from
unfounded charges, does not pertain to an indictment which is not constitutionally required.3 4 Thus, it would appear that the court's decision does
little to further the objectives which an indictment was designed to fulfill.
The statutory basis for the court's decision rested upon its construction
of rule 7(e), a construction which the dissent aptly termed a "negative
inference." 35 The dissenters enumerated several factors militating against
such an inference. First, because the general rule governing the amendment
of indictments grew out of cases in which an indictment was constitutionally
required, they found it just as logical to conclude that Congress, in enacting
rule 7 (e), intended to commit to judicial discretion those cases involving
indictments which are not constitutionally required. 86 In addition, the
dissenters noted that, although the negative inference employed by the
majority should lead to the conclusion that all amendments to indictments
other than those by the grand jury are prohibited by rule 7(e), the majority's recognition of the propriety of immaterial amendments implicitly
acknowledged that the silence of rule 7 on the subject of amending indict37
ments was not necessarily controlling.
Lastly, the court rejected the application of the harmless error provision
of rule 52 (a),38 which was advocated by the district court and the dissent.8 9
In so doing, however, it provided little support for its position. The majority
noted two disadvantages to a defendant which may result from the amendment of an indictment - the Government's expanded opportunity for dis40
covery, and the stigma attached to a defendant by a grand jury indictment.
Without offering any authority for these two rather conclusory statements,
the court's adoption of a rule disallowing indictment amendments per se is
unnecessarily harsh. It is submitted that a better solution is suggested by
the dissent - balancing the prejudice to the defendant against the weight
41
of the evidence of the defendant's guilt.

The court's decision will undoubtedly prompt prosecutors to frame all
indictments properly, for a substantial amendment to any indictment is now
clearly grounds for reversal. 42 However, the decision may also cause a
change in the charging procedures used by the Government. Whereas prior
to Goldstein the prosecution often joined misdemeanor and felony charges
against a single defendant in one indictment, the desire to protect itself in
case of error may now cause it to utilize both an indictment and an
information. Although this may cause additional paperwork, to the extent
that the decision encourages prosecutors to bring charges by information
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 532 (Hunter, J., dissenting).
502 F.2d at 533.
Id. at 533 n.6.
Id. at 533-34 n.7.
502 F.2d at 531; see note 24 supra.
502 F.2d at 535.
Id.; see note 22 supra.
502 F.2d at 534; see text accompanying note 30 supra.
42. See 43 FORDHAm L. REV. 648, 654 (1975).
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in appropriate cases, rather than by indictment, the grand jury load is
reduced.
Whether the Goldstein decision will be followed in other circuits is
questionable. Although two other courts have held that a misdemeanor
indictment cannot be expressly or constructively amended, 4 3 neither case
advanced any sound reason in support of its holding. 4 Because of its
inconsistent interpretation of rule 7(e), and its cursory rejection of the
harmless error provision of rule 52 (a), Goldstein's precedential value stands
open to question.
Although the Goldstein decision affords defendants maximum protection, it forces prosecutors to split their cases along felony-misdemeanor
lines, imposing an inflexibility upon the Government which is neither constitutionally nor statutorily mandated.
Carol Ann Meehan

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

MURDER DEFENDANT,
DUE PROCESS UPON REQUEST, ENTITLED TO VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER INSTRUCTION EVEN ABSENT EVIDENCE OF PROVOCATION OR PASSION.

United States ex rel. Matthews v. Johnson (1974)
Charged with felony-murder, defendant Matthews was convicted in a
state court of first degree murder.' Following an unsuccessful appeal to
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 2 the defendant petitioned the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for a writ
of habeas corpus. 3 In his petition, the defendant challenged the trial judge's
refusal to include a charge on voluntary manslaughter along with his instructions on first and second degree murder, even though it was admitted
43. United States v. Fischetti, 450 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
1016 (1972)

(trial court permitted misdemeanor to be amended to include "unlawfully,

willfully and knowingly" element) ; United States v. Lippi, 190 F. Supp. 604 (D. Del.
1961) (misdemeanor indictment alleged receipt of "money," but prosecution evidence
only proved receipt of "other thing of value").
44. See 502 F.2d at 534 n.11.
1. Commonwealth v. Matthews, Crim. No. 888 (Philadelphia Common Pleas,
Apr. 16, 1969). The evidence showed that defendant Matthews had participated in
the robbery of Randolph Butts, and that during the perpetration of that felony, the
victim had been stabbed four times, resulting in his death. Matthews was sentenced
to life imprisonment. Commonwealth v. Matthews, 446 Pa. 65, 68, 285 A.2d 510,
511 (1971).
2. Commonwealth v. Matthews, 446 Pa. 65, 285 A.2d 510 (1971). The defendant
argued that the judge's refusal to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter was a
denial of due process and equal protection. However, a majority of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court dismissed this argument on statutory grounds, stating that without
evidence of provocation and passion a voluntary manslaughter instruction was, by
definition, not required. Id. at 74, 285 A.2d at 514. For text of pertinent statute, see
note 7 infra.
3. United States ex rel. Matthews v. Johnson, Civil No. 73-159 (E.D. Pa.,
Jan. 19, 1973).
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that there was no evidence of provocation or passion.4 Arguing that there
were no standards to guide the judge in the decision to grant or refuse
the instruction, and that under similar circumstances the voluntary manslaughter instruction often was given, Matthews alleged that he had been
denied due process and equal protection under the fourteenth amendment
of the United States Constitution.5 The district court granted the petition
and the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting en
banc, affirmed, holding that the trial judge's unfettered discretion in granting or withholding an instruction on voluntary manslaughter violated due
process, and that due process required a voluntary manslaughter instruction to be given in Pennsylvania murder trials when request is duly made
by the defendant, even in the absence of evidence of provocation or passion.
United States ex rel. Matthews v. Johnson, 503 F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 952 (1975).
Although Pennsylvania's criminal code 7 and case law s require evidence
of passion and provocation for a finding of voluntary manslaughter, Pennsylvania follows the common law rule permitting the jury in a murder
trial to return a verdict of voluntary manslaughter without proof of these
elements where the evidence would support a verdict of first or second
degree murder.9 This rule was justified upon two grounds. First, voluntary manslaughter was, by definition, a lesser offense than murder but was
includible within a murder indictment.' 0 Second, such a rule recognized
4. United States ex rel. Matthews v. Johnson, 503 F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 952 (1975).
5. Id. The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part: "INlor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
6. 503 F.2d at 340.
7. Pennsylvania's criminal code on voluntary manslaughter provides in pertinent part:
A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits voluntary manslaughter if at the time of the killing he is acting under a sudden and
intense passion resulting from serious provocation by:
(1) the individual killed; or
(2) another whom the actor endeavors to kill, but he negligently or accidentally causes the death of the individual killed.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2503(a) (1973).
8. Pennsylvania courts have defined voluntary manslaughter as requiring "sufficient cause of provocation and a state of rage or passion, without time to cool, placing
the prisoner beyond the control of his reason, and suddenly impelling him to the deed."
Commonwealth v. Paese, 220 Pa. 373, 69 A. 891, 892 (1908); accord, Commonwealth
v. Walters, 431 Pa. 74, 244 A.2d 757 (1968).
9. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hill, 444 Pa. 323, 281 A.2d 859 (1971) ; Commonwealth v. Moore, 398 Pa. 198, 157 A.2d 65 (1959) ; Commonwealth v. Steele, 362 Pa.
427, 66 A.2d 825 (1949). For a discussion of the historical background of this rule,
see Commonwealth v. Jones, 457 Pa. 563, 566-73, 319 A.2d 142, 144-48, cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1000 (1974).
10. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Arcuroso, 283 Pa. 84, 128 A. 668 (1925);
Commonwealth v. Kellyon, 278 Pa. 59, 122 A. 166 (1923). Typically, the lesser
included offense is a part of the greater offense, and is, therefore, supported by the same
evidence as the greater offense. However, in Arcuroso and Kellyon, convictions of
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the "mercy-dispensing" power of the jury." The jury could return a
verdict of voluntary manslaughter even absent any instruction to that
effect from the trial judge, though the likelihood that the jury would
realize that this option existed absent such an instruction was remote.
Where the trial judge did not give the voluntary manslaughter instruction and the jury convicted the defendant of murder in the first or second
degree, the judge's decision would be affirmed on appeal, as long as there
was no evidence to support a manslaughter conviction. 12 The appellate
courts reasoned that, while an instruction should be refused only when
there was clearly no evidence of provocation or passion,' 3 it was not error
voluntary manslaughter, which were based solely upon evidence of murder, were
upheld even though evidence required for a voluntary manslaughter conviction is
different in kind, and not merely in degree. But see Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S.

205, 208 (1973) ; Sansone v.United States, 380 U.S. 343, 350 (1965) ; and Berra v.
United States, 351 U.S. 131, 133-34 (1956).
11. Commonwealth v. Jones, 457 Pa. 563, 573, 319 A.2d 142, 147 (1974). See,
e.g., Commonwealth v. Kenney, 449 Pa. 562, 297 A.2d 794 (1972) (Roberts, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Hill, 444 Pa. 323, 281 A.2d 859 (1971); Commonwealth
v. Hoffman, 439 Pa. 348, 266 A.2d 726 (1970); Commonwealth v. Moore, 398 Pa.
198, 157 A.2d 65 (1959) ; Commonwealth v. Steele, 362 Pa. 427, 66 A.2d 825 (1949) ;
Commonwealth v. Kellyon, 278 Pa. 59, 122 A. 166 (1923). The "mercy-dispensing"
rationale posits that if a jury has the power "to acquit altogether, in the face of the
clearest evidence," it can certainly find a lesser verdict in the face of evidence that
would have sustained murder in the first or second degree. McMeen v. Commonwealth, 114 Pa. 300, 306, 9 A. 878, 879 (1886). A less frequently articulated, but no
less compelling, reason why voluntary manslaughter verdicts have been upheld on
appeal is that if a defendant were found guilty of voluntary manslaughter, he or she
would thereby be acquitted automatically of the greater offenses of murder in the
first or second degree and would necessarily be set free if the conviction of voluntary
manslaughter were reversed on appeal because it was unsupported by the evidence.
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957). Therefore, as long as the jury could
have found evidence to sustain a conviction of murder in the first or second degree,
the voluntary manslaughter conviction was allowed to stand. Relying upon this
rationale, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that to free the criminal because
there is no evidence of voluntary manslaughter "would be an adherence to form completely oblivious to our responsibility to society." Commonwealth v. Butcher, 451 Pa.
359, 365, 304 A.2d 150, 153 (1973). For similarly reasoned cases, see, e.g., Belton v.
United States, 382 F.2d 150 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Commonwealth v. Frazier, 420 Pa. 209,
216 A.2d 337 (1966).
12. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cannon, 453 Pa. 389, 309 A.2d 384 (1973);
Commonwealth v. Kenney, 449 Pa. 562, 297 A.2d 794 (1972); Commonwealth v.
Pavillard, 421 Pa. 571, 220 A.2d 807 (1966); Commonwealth v. LaRue, 381 Pa. 113,
112 A.2d 362 (1955); Commonwealth v. Yeager, 329 Pa. 81, 196 A. 827 (1938);
Commonwealth v. Crossmire, 156 Pa. 304, 27 A. 40 (1893) ; Commonwealth v. Buccieri,
153 Pa. 535, 26 A. 228 (1893).
13. Commonwealth v. Carroll, 326 Pa. 135, 191 A. 610 (1937). However, if
there is any evidence of provocation and passion, it is the duty of the jury, not the
judge, to weigh it.See, e.g., Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895), cited with
approval in Andersen v. United States, 170 U.S. 481, 510 (1898), and Stevenson v.
United States, 162 U.S. 313, 315 (1896). Therefore, even a small amount of evidence
is enough to require a voluntary manslaughter instruction. See Commonwealth v.
Curcio, 216 Pa. 380, 383, 65 A. 792, 793 (1907). But see Belton v. United States,
382 F.2d 150 (D.C. Cir. 1967), in which the failure to give a manslaughter instruction
was upheld although there was some evidence to support that offense. Such a verdict
by the jury, the court reasoned, would have been based upon speculation, for neither
party advanced a theory which would have supported a manslaughter conviction.
Id. at 155-56.
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for a court to refuse it in such cases, for to do otherwise would confuse
the jury. 14 Thus, whether the judge gave or refused to give a voluntary
manslaughter instruction and whether the jury convicted of voluntary
manslaughter or of murder, the verdict was always upheld. In practice,
therefore, the jury was often limited by the judge who made the decision
whether or not to inform them of their right at common law to return a
voluntary manslaughter verdict unsupported by evidence of provocation
and passion.
Disturbed by this history of unfettered discretion, the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania recently devised a standard 15 for the guidance of trial
judges. In Commonwealth v. Jones,' although the court was evenly
divided upon the issue of whether the defendant's murder conviction should
be affirmed,'1 7 all the justices agreed that an instruction on voluntary manslaughter should be given if requested by counsel.' 8 The three justices who
voted for affirmance argued that under their supervisory power it was
proper to require the judge, upon request, to inform the jury of its recognized mercy-dispensing power. 19 However, they applied this rule only
prospectively, concluding that Jones himself had not been prejudiced by
the lack of instruction because the jury, having chosen first degree murder
and not second, was apparently not inclined to extend mercy.2 0 Three
14. Davis v. United States, 165 U.S. 373 (1897).

Although the jury has the

exclusive right to fix the degree of a crime, Commonwealth v. Meas, 415 Pa. 41,
202 A.2d 74 (1964), the court must fix the legal limits open to the jury. United
States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1973); Commonwealth v. Dews, 429 Pa.
555, 239 A.2d 382 (1968).
15. This standard had previously been proposed in a number of dissenting
opinions: Commonwealth v. Cannon, 453 Pa. 389, 309 A.2d 384 (1973) (Roberts, J.,
Pomeroy, J., and Manderino, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Kenney, 449 Pa. 562,
297 A.2d 794 (1972)
(Roberts, J., Pomeroy, J., and Manderino, J., dissenting);
Commonwealth v. Banks, 447 Pa. 356, 285 A.2d 506 (1971) (Pomeroy, J. and Roberts,
J., dissenting); and Commonwealth v. Pavillard, 421 Pa. 571, 220 A.2d 807 (1966)
(Cohen, J. and Jones, J., dissenting). By 1972, the number of dissenters had grown
and the court found itself evenly divided upon the issue of the voluntary manslaughter
instruction. Commonwealth v. Davis, 449 Pa. 468, 297 A.2d 817 (1972), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 836 (1973). In Davis, the defendant, who had been convicted of first degree
murder pursuant to an attempt to commit rape or sodomy, alleged that the court had
erred in charging the jury that as a matter of law they could not find him guilty of
voluntary manslaughter. 449 Pa. at 471-73, 297 A.2d at 821. Three members of the
court urged reversal of his conviction upon constitutional due process grounds, but
because the court was evenly divided, the sentence was affirmed. Id. at 471, 297
A.2d at 817.
16. 457 Pa. 563, 319 A.2d 142, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1000 (1974).
17. 457 Pa. at 564, 319 A.2d at 143. Justices Nix, Eagen, and O'Brien voted to
affirm, whereas Justices Roberts, Pomeroy, and Manderino would have reversed. The
defendant argued on appeal that the trial judge's refusal to give an instruction on
voluntary manslaughter had denied him due process although there was concededly
no evidence upon which a jury could properly base a verdict of voluntary manslaughter. Id.
18. Id. at 573, 578, 319 A.2d at 148, 151.
19. Id. at 573, 319 A.2d at 148.
20. Id. at 574, 319 A.2d at 148. Although this reasoning could possibly be applied
to future cases in which an instruction is refused in disregard of Jones' holding, such
reasoning would render Jones meaningless. For the Matthews court's ruling upon
this issue, see note 41 infra.
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justices argued for reversal on the constitutional ground that due process
was denied.21 In their opinion, the requirement of a mandatory instruction
22
should have been applied to the case before them.
Since Jones was inapplicable in the instant case because of its solely
prospective application, 23 the Third Circuit, faced with an appeal upon
constitutional grounds, reexamined the problem of the voluntary manslaughter instruction in a murder trial. 24 The Third Circuit found that
the total lack of judicial standards for giving or withholding the instruction,
coupled with the jury's absolute right to render a voluntary manslaughter
verdict in a murder trial, resulted in a violation of defendant's due process.2 5
Having thus framed the issue for decision upon due process grounds,
the court was able to distinguish a line of cases wherein murder verdicts
were upheld even though manslaughter instructions were omitted or
21. 457 Pa. at 578, 319 A.2d at 151.
22. Id.
23. 503 F.2d at 340 n.2. Matthews' trial was completed before the decision in
Jones was reached.
24. Id. at 341. The majority adopted the legal framework espoused by Justice
Pomeroy in his dissent in Commonwealth v. Matthews. Id. at 341, quoting Commonwealth v. Matthews, 446 Pa. 65, 79-80, 285 A.2d 510, 517 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting).
Justice Pomeroy focused on the anomaly between the jury's power to return a verdict
of voluntary manslaughter unsupported by the evidence and the judge's discretion in
informing the jury of that power. Commonwealth v. Matthews, supra, at 79-80, 285
A.2d 510, 517 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting). The explanation for the jury's power,
according to Justice Pomeroy, was that since voluntary manslaughter is a lesser
offense included within a murder indictment, factors such as sympathy and an appreciation of the extenuating circumstances may lead the jury to return a verdict of the
lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter. Id. This analysis, however, ignores both
the issue of double jeopardy and the line of cases in which a voluntary manslaughter
instruction was not given and was considered unnecessary by the appellate court.
See notes 11 and 12 and accompanying text supra. Judge Adams, concurring in
Matthews, differed from the majority only in insisting that the Third Circuit itself
must research the Pennsylvania case law. 503 F.2d at 349 (Adams, J., concurring).
However, Judge Adams' examination of the Pennsylvania cases convinced him too
that trial judges possessed the discretion to give or withhold a voluntary manslaughter
instruction. Id.
25. 503 F.2d 339. Judge Kalodner specifically addressed this due process argument in his dissenting opinion in Matthews, highlighting three other major points.
Id. at 351-57 (Kalodner, J., dissenting). First, he stated that there is no case, state
or federal, which requires a voluntary manslaughter instruction in a rnurder trial
in the absence of evidence of passion and provocation. Id. at 351. On the contrary,
he argued, the cases show that an instruction on a lesser included offense is required
only if the evidence would support a verdict of the lesser offense; see note 10 supra.
Second, he noted that under Pennsylvania case law the jury's power to return a
verdict of voluntary manslaughter exists whether or not a charge is given on that
offense. Id. at 353. Third, he distinguished common law murder from felony-murder.
Quoting extensively from Commonwealth v. Meleskie, 278 Pa. 387, 123 A. 310 (1924),
Judge Kalodner contended that there was a settled "legal standard" in Pennsylvania
with regard to the unavailability of a voluntary manslaughter defense in a felonymurder trial. 503 F.2d at 357; see notes 36-41 and accompanying text infra. Finally,
with regard to the due process argument, he concluded:
[A] defendant in a murder trial . . . is not denied due process when he is

refused a voluntary manslaughter instruction to which he is not entitled ... simply
because defendants in other murder trials have been accorded a voluntary manslaughter instruction in the absence of any evidentiary basis for such an instruction.
503 F.2d at 357.
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denied.2 6 Cases such as Sparf v. United States,27 and Virgin Islands v.
Carmona,28 urged by the Government, 29 were not controlling, the court
reasoned, because these cases had involved only the statutory construction
of the crime of voluntary manslaughter and had not considered the consti30
tutional question of due process.
With respect to the reverse situation, the Commonwealth argued that
appellate courts which had upheld convictions of voluntary manslaughter
where the trial court had erroneously submitted that offense to the jury
had been motivated primarily by the prohibition against double jeopardy,31
and that merely because some defendants had benefited from overly
favorable instructions, it did not follow that all defendants were entitled
to such treatment. 32 The Third Circuit's response was twofold. First,
the court concluded that rather than the constraints of double jeopardy,
the controlling factors in such decisions were the inclusion of voluntary
manslaughter as a lesser offense in a homicide charge and the jury's "mercydispensing" power.3 3 The court found that the concurrence of these two
factors gave the jury the authority to return a voluntary manslaughter
verdict.34 Second, the court noted its inability to find any Pennsylvania
26. Id. at 343. The Government's line of cases included: Commonwealth v.
Cannon, 453 Pa. 389, 309 A.2d 384 (1973); Commonwealth v. Kenney, 449 Pa. 562,
297 A.2d 794 (1972) ; Commonwealth v. Pavillard, 421 Pa. 571, 220 A.2d 807 (1966) ;
Commonwealth v. LaRue, 381 Pa. 113, 112 A.2d 362 (1955); Commonwealth v.
Yaeger, 329 Pa. 81, 196 A. 827 (1938) ; Commonwealth v. Carroll, 326 Pa. 135, 191
A. 610 (1937) ; Commonwealth v. Crossmire, 156 Pa. 304, 27 A. 40 (1893) ; Commonwealth v. Buccieri, 153 Pa. 535, 26 A. 228 (1893).
27. 156 U.S. 51 (1895). In Sparf, the United States Supreme Court approved a
jury charge that was given in a trial for murder on the high seas which explicitly
instructed a jury that it was not authorized to return a verdict of manslaughter. Id.
28. 422 F.2d 95 (3d Cir. 1970). In this case, involving a charge of felony-murder,
the Third Circuit held that a voluntary manslaughter charge was not required, since
voluntary manslaughter is not "necessarily included" in a felony-murder. Id. at 100.
29. 503 F.2d at 343.
30. Id. In many of the Pennsylvania cases which had been decided upon statutory
grounds, the dissenters had discussed the question of due process. The majorities, by
not discussing the constitutional issue raised in their cases impliedly upheld the constitutionality of the decisions; see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Matthews, 446 Pa. 65, 285
A.2d 510 (1971); Commonwealth v. Pavillard, 421 Pa. 571, 220 A.2d 807 (1966).
31. 503 F.2d at 343; see note 11 supra.
32. 503 F.2d at 343.
33. Id. at 344.
34. Id. at 343-44. The court stated that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had
based its decisions which upheld manslaughter verdicts rendered without supporting
evidence upon
a realistic appreciation of the humanity of those who sit on our juries and the legal
concept that voluntary manslaughter is by definition a lesser [included] offense
than murder but one included in a murder indictment.
Id. at 344, quoting Commonwealth v. Hoffman, 439 Pa. 348, 359, 266 A.2d 726, 732.
See also Commonwealth v. Robinson, 305 Pa. 302, 157 A. 689 (1912), where the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court approved the following instruction:
While we have defined to you the crime of voluntary manslaughter, we say to
you, members of the jury, as we view the case, there is no evidence in it that
would warrant a verdict of voluntary manslaughter, although, in the absence of
evidence, it is within your power to render such a verdict, because, in the crime
of murder, the jury has the right to fix the degree of the homicide.
Id. at 309, 157 A. at 692.
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Supreme Court decision which had unequivocally held that it would be
error for a judge to give a charge on voluntary manslaughter without
supporting evidence in a trial for murder.35
The court then addressed the due process issue, recognizing its obligation to determine whether the proceedings in the instant case "offend [ed]
those cannons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice
of English-speaking peoples." 36 Applying this concept of due process to
the instant case, the court concluded that the absence of fixed standards
for the submission of a manslaughter instruction to the jury resulted in
arbitrary decisions,3 7 thus violating due process. 38 In addition, the court
emphasized the fact that this power over a defendant's life and liberty was
a matter historically left to the jury precisely as a safeguard against arbitrary or overzealous judges. 89
35. 503 F.2d at 344. However, it is difficult to imagine a situation where a court
would so hold. For example, if the instruction on voluntary manslaughter were given
and the jury nevertheless convicted of first or second degree murder, there would be
no appeal with regard to the manslaughter instruction. On the other hand, if the jury
did convict of voluntary manslaughter the refusal to reverse on appeal would certainly
have been strongly motivated by the fact that a reversal would result in an acquittal;
see notes 9-11 and accompanying text supra. However, the fact that there were no
reversals in trials where no instruction was given and the verdict was murder is
arguably indicative of the court's position on this matter. If the lack of a voluntary
manslaughter instruction were erroneous, it would certainly be prejudicial error and
in such a case, the defendant, not having been acquitted of murder, could be retried.
Nevertheless, no Pennsylvania case has been found which reversed a murder conviction
or ordered a new trial upon the grounds that no voluntary manslaughter instruction
was given, where evidence of provocation or passion was absent.
36. 503 F.2d at 344, quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J.) (citation omitted).
37. 503 F.2d at 345. As evidence that there were no legally fixed standards, the
court quoted from the opinion in support of affirmance in the felony-murder case of
Commonwealth v. Davis, 449 Pa. 468, 297 A.2d 817 (1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 836
(1973). That opinion stated:
Although the establishment of objective standards for application in all cases
must await the further development of our case law, we believe that the instant
case presents an excellent example of that type of case where it is perfectly proper
for a trial judge to eliminate completely the jury's consideration of the possibility
of a voluntary manslaughter verdict.
449 Pa. at 475, 297 A.2d at 821 (emphasis added). It should be noted, however, that
the Third Circuit quoted only the first phrase of this sentence, omitting the italicized
clause which distinguished the felony-murder situation from other cases; see 503 F.2d
at 345.
38. 503 F.2d at 345. The court cited Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399
(1966), in which a Pennsylvania statute which permitted jurors to determine whether
the defendant should pay costs was held unconstitutional because of vagueness and the
absence of any standards sufficient to enable defendants to protect themselves against
arbitrary and discriminatory imposition of costs. Id. at 402-03. The dissent in
Matthews argued that the rationale of Giaccio should not be interpreted so as to
impose different criminal procedures on the states simply because the Third Circuit
believed current procedures to be unfair. 503 F.2d at 357-58 (Kalodner, J., dissenting).
However, the dissent's discussion of the jurisdiction of the respective federal and state
courts was somewhat irrelevant, since the state supreme court had recently reached
the same conclusion the federal court was reaching here in Commonwealth v. Jones,
457 Pa. 563, 319 A.2d 142, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1000 (1974).
39. 503 F.2d at 345.
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Even conceding that this was a valid constitutional argument, the
Commonwealth further argued that any error concerning the voluntary
manslaughter instruction was harmless, because the jury, given a choice
between first or second degree murder, had chosen murder in the first
degree. 40 The court refuted this contention, stating that it was impossible
to be certain beyond a reasonable doubt that, given three options, the
verdict would not have differed. 41 Thus, the court concluded that the viola42
tion of due process constituted error as to this defendant.
The court's decision was based upon the absence of standards in Pennsylvania with respect to the giving or withholding of a voluntary manslaughter instruction. 43 However, it could be argued that standards did
exist with regard to felony-murder cases. A survey made by the Commonwealth of the cases in which an instruction on voluntary manslaughter was
given, despite the lack of supporting evidence, showed that in every case
the court dealt with common law murder, not felony-murder, and that
there was some evidence that could have been construed as showing
provocation or passion.44 In no case had.the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
40. Id. at 346. The United States Supreme Court has held that an error must
be "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" for a conviction to be upheld. Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
41. 503 F.2d at 346. The Third Circuit reasoned that if the jury had three
options - murder in the first or second degree and manslaughter - instead of two,
it might "have compromised on the middle ground of second degree." Id.
42. Id. A majority of the Matthews court decided not to resolve the issue of
retroactivity of the court's holding. Id. at 347. The writer of the opinion, Judge
Aldisert, joined by Judges Rosenn and Weis, nonetheless discussed the factors involved
in deciding the issue of retroactivity. Three factors were deemed to be essential:
"(a) the purpose to be served by the new standard, (b) the extent of the reliance by
law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards." Id. at 347-48,
quoting United States v. Zirpolo, 450 F.2d 424, 431-33 (3d Cir. 1971). They concluded that each of these three factors indicated that full retroactivity should not be
accorded to the instant decision, stating that "our decision . . . [should] apply only
to those cases . . . [in which a jury instruction for voluntary manslaughter was
properly and timely requested and] if trials have been completed, are on direct appeal
[in the Pennsylvania courts] on this date." 503 F.2d at 348-49, quoting United States
v. Zirpolo, supra at 433; see United States ex rel. Cannon v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp.
1362 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (Matthews rule held not to have retroactive application).
43. See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
44. The Commonwealth in its Petition for a Rehearing with Oral Argument at
3 & 4, listed the following cases where voluntary manslaughter verdicts were upheld
in the absence of passion or provocation:
Cases cited in Magistrate's Report: Commonwealth v. Hill, 444 Pa. 323
(1971) (Hill and the female deceased were tenants in the same apartment house) ;
Commonwealth v. Hoffman, 439 Pa. 348 (1970) (Hoffman killed the deceased
during a fight in a bar) ; Commonwealth v. Harry, 437 Pa. 432 (1970) (Harry
killed the deceased during an argument which occurred while the deceased w's
visiting Harry's home) ; Commonwealth v. Dennis, 433 Pa. 525 (1969) (Dennis
killed his girlfriend); Commonwealth v. Cooney, 431 Pa. 153 (1968) (Cooney
killed his mistress) ; Commonwealth v. Frazier, 420 Pa. 209 (1966) (Frazier
killed his wife) ; Commonwealth v. Arcuroso, 283 Pa. 84 (1925) (although the
facts here are not clear, it appears that the killing arose out of an altercation on
the street; in any event, Arcuroso was not involved in committing any felony at
the time of the killing, although he claimed the deceased was attempting to commit
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upheld a verdict of voluntary manslaughter in a pure felony-murder case. 45
The Commonwealth argued that whenever such a verdict had been upheld,
while there had been no evidence of the passion or provocation required
to show voluntary manslaughter, the evidence presented a situation of
common law murder involving people with some sort of sexual, social,
familial, or emotional connection between them.4 6 By contrast, the evi4 7
dence in Matthews involved only felony-murder.
Traditionally, the purpose of felony-murder has been to punish as
murder any killing which occurs during the commission of a felony, with
the element of malice necessary for a verdict of murder being supplied by
the presence of an intent to commit the felony. 48 Thus, to allow an instruction of voluntary manslaughter to be considered by the jury would
seem to contradict the very purpose served by this category of crime. 49
robbery on him) ; Commonwealth v. Gable, 7 Serg. & R. 423 (1821) (the facts are
not stated in the opinion; the felony-murder rule is, however, not mentioned).
Additional cases cited in appellee's brief: Commonwealth v. Nelson, 396 Pa.
359 (1959) (Nelson killed her husband); Commonwealth v. Steele, 362 Pa. 427
(1949) (Steele killed his wife) ....
Id.
45. The only cases cited by the Commonwealth in its Petition for a Rehearing
with Oral Argument or in either party's brief, in which a verdict of voluntary manslaughter was returned in a felony-murder case, were Commonwealth v. Kellyon, 278
Pa. 59, 122 A. 166 (1923) and Commonwealth v. Butcher, 451 Pa. 359, 304 A.2d 150
(1973). In Kellyon,
while the prosecution proceeded on the theory that the killing occurred while the
defendant was committing the felony of robbery, according to the defendant's
version the defendant and the deceased went to a certain place for the purpose of
engaging in immoral actions, and a quarrel ensued between the two as the result
of which the deceased was shot. Thus, there was evidence in the case of commonlaw first degree murder which the trial judge concluded led the jury to reach its
verdict of voluntary manslaughter.
Commonwealth's Petition for a Rehearing with Oral Argument at 4. For a discussion
of Butcher, see notes 52-55 and accompanying text infra.
46. Commonwealth's Petition for a Rehearing with Oral Argument at 5; see
note 44 supra.
47. See note 1 and accompanying text supra.
48. Commonwealth v. Carelli, 281 Pa. 602, 127 A. 305 (1924); Commonwealth
v. Meleskie, 278 Pa. 383, 123 A. 310 (1924). In Meleskie, the court upheld the refusal
of the trial court to give a voluntary manslaughter instruction in a felony-murder
case, even though there was some evidence of provocation. Id. at 386, 123 A. at 311.
Because felony-murder is defined as causing the death of another during the perpetration of an enumerated felony "without regard to the existence of an intent to
kill," id., the Meleskie court noted that the existence of provocation or passion was
legally irrelevant. Id.
49. It is important to distinguish felony-murder, where evidence of provocation
or passion is legally irrelevant, and common law murder, where such evidence may
reduce an intentional killing from murder to manslaughter. When courts use the
standard phrase "no evidence of provocation or passion" with reference to common
law murder, they may actually be referring to evidence which is legally insufficient.
See note 44 supra. However, in a felony-murder situation, evidence of provocation
or passion, even if it did exist and were legally sufficient to sustain a voluntary manslaughter conviction, would have no relevance to the offense charged. Furthermore,
in a trial for common law murder, evidence which could be construed as showing
provocation or passion may nevertheless not be introduced for many reasons. A
defendant who claimed that he or she was not at the scene of the murder would not
inconsistently argue that he or she was provoked. E.g., Commonwealth v. Hoffman,
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The use of a separate standard to guide the judge's instructions in a felonymurder trial, as urged by the Commonwealth, 50 was summarily dismissed
by the Third Circuit in a footnote. 51 The court noted that in Commonwealth v. Butcher,5 2 a felony-murder case, the verdict of voluntary manslaughter was allowed to stand, thus demonstrating the jury's power to
return such a verdict in a felony-murder case. 53 The Third Circuit failed
to note, however, that the jury had acquitted the defendant on the robbery
charge, making the case one of common law murder.5 4 Furthermore, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Butcher explained that, although it was
forced to affirm because of the double jeopardy rule, it found the decision
legally unjustifiable. 5 The further reliance by the Third Circuit upon the
fact that Jones did not distinguish felony-murder cases is faulty; since
Jones was not a felony-murder case, any such discussion by the Jones court
would have been dicta.
The decision to make the voluntary manslaughter instruction mandatory upon request by counsel avoids the more difficult problem of having
to establish standards as to the kind of evidence which warrants a manslaughter instruction.5" However, by so avoiding the definition of standards,
the court formalized a situation in which a conviction for voluntary manslaughter, unsupported by evidence which is required according to the
definition of that crime, is upheld because the evidence would have supported a murder conviction. One conclusion is clear - the defendant in
such a case has not committed statutory voluntary manslaughter. Thus,
by judicial redefinition, the charge of voluntary manslaughter will be
allowed to be presented to the jury without evidence of passion or provocation and solely upon evidence of murder. Yet, in the very act of finding
the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter, the jury will technically
be acquitting the defendant of the crime of murder.
43-Pa.- 338, 266 A.2d 726 (1970). If a conviction of murder in the first or second
degree appeared to be provable, the prosecutor would be unlikely to introduce evidence to support a verdict of voluntary manslaughter. Such cases, in which there is
no evidence of provocation or passion, are nevertheless different from felony-murder
cases; see note 48 and accompanying text supra.
50. 503 F.2d at 346 n.22a.
51. Id.
52. 451 Pa. 359, 304 A.2d 150 (1973).
53. 503 F.2d at 346 n.22a.
54. 451 Pa. at 365, 304 A.2d at 153; see note 45 supra.
55. 451 Pa. at 365, 304 A.2d at 153. The court said:
To rule that because the testimony [did not establish the elements of voluntary
manslaughter] a finding of voluntary manslaughter must be vacated and the
defendant consequently discharged would be an adherence to form completely
oblivious to our responsibility to society. The symmetry of the law at times must
give way to the policy sought to be effectuated.
56. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Jones, id., having
just made the same decision, perhaps dictated the Third Circuit's choice of solutions.
See notes 16-23 and accompanying text supra. However, the Matthews court was
addressing the problem strictly upon constitutional grounds, and felony-murder is
clearly distinguishable in terms of due process considerations.
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The case of Commonwealth v. Frazier7 highlighted this problem
most clearly because it separated into two steps that which normally happens simultaneously. In the trial court, the defendant was charged with
murder and convicted of voluntary manslaughter.58 The conviction was
reversed because of trial error and remanded for a new trial. 59 In the
second trial the defendant was charged only with voluntary manslaughter, 0
because, having been convicted of voluntary manslaughter, he had been
acquitted of murder in the first trial. The defendant demurred to the
evidence offered by the Commonwealth on the ground that the evidence,
even if entirely true, did not prove the elements of passion or provocation necessary for a voluntary manslaughter conviction."' The demurrer
was sustained.62 The Commonwealth then appealed to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, which reversed the lower court 63 upon the grounds that
since the evidence could have sustained a murder conviction, a conviction
of voluntary manslaughter was permissible without evidence of passion
or provocation. 64 Behind the court's decision was its concern, voiced in
its opinion, 65 that a contrary result would make a mockery of the law, by
releasing into society, without acquittal by jury, but on a technical ground
a man who had been proven guilty of murder.6 6 The dissent, on the other
hand, vehemently opposed the result, arguing that it allowed the defendant
to be convicted of voluntary manslaughter not upon evidence which
proved the elements essential to such a crime, but upon evidence proving
only elements necessary for a murder conviction - a crime for which the
67
defendant had been tried and acquitted.
The holding in Matthews will legitimize the kind of voluntary manslaughter verdict which the dissent in Frazier found so legally disturbing
but which the majority felt compelled to uphold by virtue of its duty to
society. 68 Perhaps such a redefinition of the crime of voluntary manslaughter
would have been more appropriately accomplished by the legislature.69
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

420 Pa. 209, 216 A.2d 337 (1966).
Id. at 211, 216 A.2d at 337.
Id. at 211, 216 A.2d at 338.
Id.
Id. at 212, 216 A.2d at 338.
Id. at 213, 216 A.2d at 338.
Id. at 214, 216 A.2d at 339.
Id. at 213, 216 A.2d at 339.

65. Id. at 213, 216 A.2d at 338-39.
66, Id.

67. Id. at 216, 216 A.2d at 340 (Jones, J., dissenting). Also dissenting, Justice

Cohen argued that: "the majority's conclusion permits a defendant to be tried and
convicted for a crime that he did not commit on evidence of the commission of a
crime for which he has already been acquitted." Id. at 217, 216 A.2d at 340 (Cohen,
J., dissenting).
68. Frazier can be partially distinguished from cases such as Matthews, because
in Matthews murder was at least part of the indictment so that voluntary manslaughter
might arguably be treated as a lesser included offense.
69. For example, voluntary manslaughter could be included as a separate degree
of murder. However, even in the new Pennsylvania criminal code, although felony
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In a practical sense, the decision by the Third Circuit in Matthews
has a very narrow application. For future defendants, the earlier decision
in Jones had already guaranteed all that Matthews holds.70 Matthews
may, nevertheless, be more compelling than Jones as precedent, for while
the opinion in support of affirmance in Jones relied only upon the court's
supervisory power, 71 the Matthews decision rested upon constitutional
grounds and cannot be altered without a new constitutional interpretation.
Henceforth it will be counsel's obligation to request a voluntary manslaughter instruction, 72 and presumably if no such request is made, the
trial judge may not submit the instruction in the absence of evidence of provocation and passion. 73 Whenever the voluntary manslaughter instruction
is submitted without supporting evidence, juries will, in effect, be permitted
to choose a lesser degree of murder and call it voluntary manslaughter.
Jane Landes Foster

CRIMINAL LAW
TION

- ENTRAPMENT - ACCUSED'S UNDISPUTED ALLEGAOF GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT IN BOTH SUPPLYING AND

PURCHASING HEROIN CONSTITUTES ENTRAPMENT AS A MATTER OF
LAW PROSECUTION REQUIRED TO OFFER CONTRAVENING TESTIMONY ONCE DEFENDANT HAS RAISED ISSUE OF ENTRAPMENT.

United States v. West (1975)
Defendant was convicted on two counts of unlawful distribution and
one count of knowing possession of heroin.' As to the two distribution
murder is classed as second degree murder, and all other murder is termed third degree,
voluntary manslaughter still remains a separate class of homicide. PA. STAT. AN..
tit. 18, §§ 2502 and 2503 (1975).
70. See notes 16-20 and accompanying text supra. The decision in Jones, however, applies only to future trials (see note 20 and accompanying text supra) while
the Matthews court concluded that its decision should apply to future cases and to
those still "... on direct appeal in Pennsylvania courts. See note 42 supra.
71. 457 Pa. at 573, 319 A.2d at 148.
72. Counsel tactics may well influence when the instruction will be requested.
If it appears that the Commonwealth's case is weak and acquittal is possible, counsel
will most likely not request the instruction, forcing the jury to acquit for lack of
evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If on the other hand, the Commonwealth's case appears strong, the instruction will probably be requested in the hope
that the jury will be lenient. If counsel misjudges, the defendant may try to appeal,
alleging inadequate representation by counsel. However, the appeal will be successful
only if there was no reasonable basis for counsel's refusal to request the instruction.
Commonwealth v. McGrogan, 449 Pa. 584, 297 A.2d 456 (1972).
73. It has been held in Commonwealth v. Amato, 449 Pa. 592, 297 A.2d 462 (1972),
that it would be error for a court without evidence of provocation or passion and
without a request by counsel to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter. This
puts the entire burden of discretion on the counsel. It is not clear, however, that
after Matthews this will still be the rule, although to allow otherwise would again
introduce the element of judicial discretion.
1. United States v. West, 511 F.2d 1083, 1084 (3d Cir. 1975). The defendant
was charged with violating section 401 (a) of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Preven-
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counts, there was uncontradicted testimony by the accused that a government informer furnished the defendant with heroin and induced him to sell
it to a federal narcotics agent according to a prearranged plan.2 On appeal,
the Third Circuit reversed the conviction for distribution, 3 holding: 1) that
the defendant's undisputed evidence of the government's involvement in
both supplying and purchasing the heroin constituted entrapment as a
matter of law; and 2) that once the defendant introduced evidence sufficient
upon its face to prove entrapment, the prosecution was required to offer
some contrary testimony in order to avoid an acquittal. United States v.
West, 511 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975).
Entrapment is a relatively new defense in federal criminal cases. Since
1932, when the Supreme Court first recognized it as a defense,4 the Court
has been divided on the appropriate theoretical basis for its applicability;
one approach is subjective,5 the other objective. 6 The subjective approach,
which has become the test applied in the majority of cases, 7 examines the
predisposition or intent of the defendant to commit the alleged crime. Mr.
Chief Justice Hughes expounded the fundamental tenet of the subjective
standard in Sorrells v. United States." Entrapment was said to arise

when
the criminal design originates with the officials of the Government,
and they implant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to
tion and Control Act of 1970. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1970).

While the particular

statute was not cited in the court of appeals opinion, its applicability was noted in
the unreported district court opinion. United States v. West, Criminal No. 73-183, at 1
(E.D. Pa., Jan. 7, 1974).
2. 511 F.2d at 1085.
3. Since there was no evidence that the Government had supplied the narcotics
in conjunction with the third count, the court affirmed the conviction for possession,
and remanded for resentencing on that count, because the defendant previously had
received a general sentence based upon all three counts. Id. at 1087.
4. The first federal decision to reverse a conviction upon this ground was Woo
Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915). The holding was justified upon the
grounds of public policy and the defendant's lack of predisposition to commit the
offense. Id. at 415. It was not until 1932, however, that the Supreme Court recognized entrapment as a viable defense. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932)
(Government agent, by repeated solicitations and appeals to wartime reminiscences,
induced defendant to sell him illegal liquor).
The theoretical basis for entrapment rested upon judicial recognition of a
legislative intent presumed to underlie the violated statute; i.e., Congress could not
have intended that the law be enforced "by tempting innocent persons into violations."
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958) ; accord, Sorrells v. United States,
supra at 448.
5. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973) ; Sherman v. United States,
356 U.S. 369 (1958) ; Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
6. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 440-41 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ; Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 382-83 (1958) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) ; Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 453-59 (1932) (Roberts,
J., dissenting).
7. See Note, Entrapment: Sorrells to Russell, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 579,
582 (1974).
8. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
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commit the alleged offense and induce its commission in order that they
may prosecute. 9
On the other hand, the objective analysis rather than focusing upon the
individual defendant, looks instead to "the conduct of police and the likelihood objectively considered, that it would entrap only those ready and
willing to commit crime." 10
From 1958 to 1973, while some lower federal courts followed the
minority objective approach," the Third Circuit relied exclusively upon the
predisposition test. 12 In 1973, rejecting all other tests, the Supreme Court
reiterated its approval of the subjective-predisposition theory of entrapment
in United States v. Russell.'3
Despite the Russell decision, the Supreme Court has failed to delineate
the procedural aspects of the defense and, as a result, confusion in the
application of the subjective standard has been manifest in the lower
federal courts. 14 The Supreme Court has stated, however, that unless

9. Id. at 442. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958), where an
informer's repeated appeals to defendant, a former addict, to relieve the informer's
feigned craving for narcotics, induced defendant not only'to obtain a source of narcotics but also to return to his habit. The Sherman Court stated that, "a line must be
drawn between the trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal."
Id. at 372.
In order to establish the requisite predisposition, the subjective test allows
the admission into evidence without qualification defendant's prior criminal convictions
and arrests, as well as evidence of bad reputation. Compare FED. R. EvlD. 608(a) (1)
(credibility of a witness may be attacked by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness);
id. 608(b) (specific instances of witness' conduct may not be proved by extrinsic
evidence although they may be inquired into on cross-examination concerning witness'
truthfulness or untruthfulness) ; and id. 609 (evidence of witness' conviction of a
crime is admissible to attack his credibility only in limited circumstances. See United
States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 443 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ; Sorrells v.
United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451-52 (1932). For discussion concerning the prejudicial
nature of such testimony, see Note, supra note 7, at 583-84 (1974).
10. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 384 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
11. See United States v. Russell, 459 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 411 U.S.
423 (1973). In Russell, the circuit court held that "an intolerable degree of governmental participation in the criminal enterprise" is a valid defense despite defendant's
predisposition to commit the crime. 459 F.2d at 673. See also United States v. Bueno,
447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1971) (regardless of predisposition, defendant cannot be
convicted of sale or possession of contraband if government informer furnished the
illegal narcotic to defendant) ; United States v. Chisum, 312 F. Supp. 1307, 1312 (C.D.
Cal. 1970) (when the Government acts to supply illegal contraband, it cannot punish
the recipient).
12. See United States v. Silver, 457 F.2d 1217, 1222 (3d Cir. 1972); United
States v. Klosterman, 248 F.2d 191, 195 (3d Cir. 1957); United States v. Sawyer,
210 F.2d 169, 170 (3d Cir. 1954).
13. 411 U.S. 423 (1973) (5-4 decision). In Russell, the Court found no entrapment where the Government had supplied the defendant, who was already engaged in
an ongoing illegal drug manufacturing enterprise, with a legal, but difficult to obtain,
substance necessary to produce the drug. Id. at 425-27.
14. Many reversals, for example, have resulted from errors in the jury instructions concerning entrapment. See, e.g., Kadis v. United States, 373 F.2d 370 (lst
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entrapment can be decided as a matter of law, the jury should determine
the issue "as part of its function of determining the guilt or innocence of
the accused."' 5
In light of the Supreme Court's adoption of the subjective theory of
entrapment, 16 lower federal courts have recognized a variety of rules concerning burden of proof and the amount of evidence sufficient to raise the
entrapment defense. 1 7 The Third Circuit's long-settled rule on the application of the entrapment defense provides that the Government has the burden
of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not entrapped,
once a defendant has presented sufficient evidence of entrapment.' 8
In the instant case, the majority justified its holding under both the
objective and subjective theories of entrapment. Applying the former test,
the court concluded that the Government's role as supplier and purchaser
of the heroin "passed the point of toleration."' 9 Notwithstanding this
satisfaction of the objective test, the West court further concluded that the
predisposition analysis also supported its decision, rejecting the district
court's finding of an inclination upon West's part to deal in illicit drugs
Cir. 1967) ; Notaro v. United States, 363 F.2d 169 (9th Cir. 1966) ; United States v.
Pugliese, 346 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1965).
15. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 377 (1958). In Sherman, it was not
necessary to submit the question of entrapment to the jury, because the evidence in
that case resulted from the undisputed testimony of the prosecution's own witnesses.
Id. at 373. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 452 (1932) (issue of defendant's entrapment should have been submitted to jury in the case of conflicting testimony) ; cf. Masciale v. United States, 356 U.S. 386 (1958), in which defendant
testified that he was induced to sell narcotics illegally by an informer who did not
testify. Another agent did testify, however, that the defendant had previously boasted
of his narcotics supply connections. Id. at 387. The Masciale Court held that the trier
of fact was properly permitted to determine defendant's credibility. Id. at 387-88.
For a discussion of West's compatibility with the holding in Masciale, see text accompanying notes 30-35 infra.
16. See notes 5-8 and accompanying text supra.
17. For cases discussing procedural problems of the entrapment defense, see note
14 supra. For further discussion of the procedural aspects of the defense, see Beard,
The Procedural Controversy in the Defense of Entrapment, 9 S. TEX. L.J. 203, 208-10
(1967).
The Fifth Circuit alone has held that once a defendant has alleged that an
informer has supplied him with an illegal narcotic, the Government must rebut defendant's testimony in order for the case to reach the jury. United States v. Bueno,
447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1971) ; accord, United States v. Oquendo, 490 F.2d 161, 163-64
(5th Cir. 1974). However, in an ordinary entrapment case consisting of government
inducement of a previously innocent defendant by means of appeals to friendship,
sympathy, or common interests, the Fifth Circuit has held that the jury be permitted
to determine the issue of entrapment regardless of whether the informer testifies.
United States v. Gomez-Rojas, 567 F.2d 1213, 1218 (5th Cir. 1975) ; United States v.
Workopich, 479 F.2d 1142, 1146 (5th Cir. 1973).
18. United States v. Silver, 457 F.2d 1217, 1220 (3d Cir. 1972); accord, United
States v. Watson, 489 F.2d 504, 509-10 (3d Cir. 1973). The Supreme Court has only
required the defendant to present "some showing" of government inducement. Lopez
v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 435 (1963).
19. 511 F.2d at 1085. The court also stated its agreement with the Fifth Circuit's
holding in Bueno v. United States, 447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1971). Id.; see note 17 supra.
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prior to the Government-initiated scheme. 20 Thus, the court held that the
uncontradicted evidence of inducement, coupled with the Government's21
furnishing of the heroin, constituted entrapment as a matter of law.
Finally, in order to ensure that the Government actually met the burden of
proof imposed upon it by law,2 2 the court modified prior Third Circuit
practice whereby the prosecution could rest its case without having introduced any evidence to controvert the defendant's allegation of entrapment.
The court noted that the former practice often allowed the uncontradicted
testimony of the accused to reach the trier of fact so that if the trier of
fact disbelieved it, the prosecution was thereby deemed to have proved
beyond a reasonable doubt that there was no entrapment.2 3 As a result of
this situation, the burden of coming forward was, in effect, being shifted
to the accused. To prevent such a result, the West decision imposed upon
the prosecution "the burden of making some showing contrary to the testimony of the accused" once the defendant has sufficiently raised the issue
24
of entrapment.
By apparently affirming the viability of the objective theory of entrapment, the Third Circuit has taken a controversial stand in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Russell.2 5 The West court's
attempt to limit Russell to its facts 26 seems to be an overly narrow interpretation of the Supreme Court's renunciation 7 of the objective theory of
entrapment. It is submitted that in a situation in which the Government
both furnished and purchased the heroin, the court could have justified a

20. 511 F.2d at 1086. "At this point it is noteworthy that, in the course of his
concluding argument, the prosecutor, with commendable candor, conceded that West
had no history of past participation in the narcotics traffic." Id. at 1085.
21. Id. at 1086.
22. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
23. 511 F.2d at 1087.
24. Id.
25. 411 U.S. 423 (1973) ; see text accompanying note 13 supra. The Third Circuit's position also conflicts with several post-Russell circuit decisions which have
interpreted Russell to preclude any entrapment defense not based upon the predisposition test. See, e.g., United States v. Hampton, 507 F.2d 832, 835 (7th Cir. 1974)
("Russell forecloses . . . any theory other than predisposition") (dictum) ; United
States v. Jett, 491 F.2d 1078, 1081 (1st Cir. 1974) ("we do not accept Bueno");
United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1222 (2d Cir. 1973) (if defendant is predisposed, the "conviction will generally stand regardless of the Government's activity") ;
United States v. Croxton, 482 F.2d 231, 234 (9th Cir. 1973) (for a valid entrapment
defense, defendant must prove government implanted criminal design into defendant's
mind); United States v. Hayes, 477 F.2d 868, 873 (10th Cir. 1973) ("the Supreme
Court has recently rejected reasoning similar to that found in . . . Bueno") (dictum).
26. 511 F.2d at 1086. The court distinguished Russell on two grounds. In
Russell, defendant was believed to be engaged in an ongoing drug manufacturing
enterprise, and the Government supplied him with a legal, but rare, necessary ingredient. 411 U.S. at 425-26. In contrast, in West, there was no evidence that
defendant had any prior inclination to engage in drug traffic; in addition, the Government furnished West with actual contraband. 511 F.2d at 1086.
27. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
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dismissal upon the grounds that such government behavior constituted a
28
violation of due process, a possibility mentioned by the Russell Court.
Instead, the majority in West summarily supported their application of
the objective theory solely upon the rationale that such police conduct
"serves no justifying social objective. '29 While such a rationale is a valid
basis upon which to declare conduct intolerable under the objective test,
it in no way explains the Third Circuit's adherence to a standard longdisavowed by the United States Supreme Court.
Particularly disturbing was the majority's treatment of the Supreme
Court decision, Masciale v. United States,30 in which the conviction
of the defendant was upheld even though there was no direct contradiction of his testimony that he had been entrapped.8 1 It is difficult
to accept the Third Circuit's argument that the prosecution, in Masciale,
satisfied its burden by presenting the testimony of a government narcotics
agent who raised some doubts as to the credibility of the defendant. 32 The
majority attempted to distinguish the factual situations of the two cases
by noting that the agent in Masciale alleged that the defendant had previously boasted of his ability to obtain heroin, whereas in West, there was
no rebuttal at all of defendant's allegations that the informer had supplied
him with the heroin.83 Such an explanation, however, does not adequately

distinguish Masciale's holding that defense testimony as to entrapment
84
is merely evidence which may be either believed or rejected by the jury.
28. 411 U.S. at 431-32 (dictum). The Supreme Court suggested that a future

case might involve police conduct "so outrageous that due process principles would
absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction."
Id. However, the Court found no due process violation in that case, and it is not clear
from the opinion whether the controlling element was the legality of the substance
supplied by the police or the predisposition of the defendant. See id. at 432. See also
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952)
(forced stomach pumping of the
defendant in order to retrieve morphine capsules held to be violation of due process
because it constituted "conduct that shocks the conscience"). For a proposal urging
the adoption of a constitutional basis for the entrapment defense, see Note, The Serpent Beguiled Me and I Did Eat - The Constitutional Status of the Entrapment
Defense, 74 YALE L.J. 942 (1965).
29. 511 F.2d at 1085.
30. 356 U.S. 386 (1958). Masciale, a troublesome case, has created much confusion as to its actual holding and was a major point of disagreement between the
West majority and dissent. The Second and Seventh Circuits have read Masciale as
holding that where defendant's undisputed testimony raises the defense of entrapment, the trier of fact must determine defendant's credibility. United States v. Deutsch,
451 F.2d 98, 115 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1019 (1972); United States
v. Cansler, 419 F.2d 952 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1029 (1970) ; United
States v. Thomas, 351 F.2d 538, 539 (2d Cir. 1965).
In contrast, the Third Circuit previously has asserted that in Masciale, "there
was conflicting evidence on the issue of entrapment, and the district court [properly]
submitted the issue to the jury." United States v. Santore, 270 F.2d 949, 951 (3d Cir.
1959) (emphasis added).
31. 356 U.S. at 388.
32. Id. at 387.
33. 511 F.2d at 1086-87.
34. 356 U.S. at 388.
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Thus, Judge Weis' dissenting opinion, in West, that "the majority opinion
is contrary to Masciale and unduly inhibits the scope of the fact finder's
competence" 3 5 appears to be the more supportable position.
The portion of the West decision dealing with the new procedural rule
also is troublesome due to the court's use of broad language.36 It is unclear
whether the Third Circuit will only require the prosecution to present
contrary testimony when the Government supplies the contraband, as does
the Fifth Circuit,3 7 or whether the court intended this novel procedure to
extend to all entrapment cases. While the facts of West are limited to
supporting the former interpretation, the breadth and generality of the
holding as stated by the court 38 would lend credence to the latter reading.
The significance of the instant opinion is twofold. First, the West
decision is a further indication that despite the Supreme Court's reaffirmation of the subjective theory of entrapment,3 9 the objective theory remains
viable in some lower federal courts. 40 The continued confusion in this area
of the law points out the necessity for a more comprehensive ruling by the
standSupreme Court, or alternatively, federal legislation creating uniform
41
defense.
entrapment
the
of
scope
the
define
would
which
ards
Second, although the West opinion carries significant procedural implications for the entrapment defense, they are difficult to assess because
of the majority's broad language. 42 District courts will face the decision
of whether the newly adopted procedure is applicable to ordinary entrapment cases as well as to those situations where, as here, the defendant serves
merely as a conduit between two government agents. Within the Third
Circuit, the West decision will probably result in a substantial practical
impact, i.e. the government informer may frequently be forced to testify
in order to avoid the defendant's acquittal. There is little likelihood, how43
ever, that other circuit courts of appeals will follow this extreme holding.
Pamela J. Karr
35. 511 F.2d at 1089 (Weis, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
36. The court stated:
[T]he burden of making some showing contrary to the testimony of the accused,
must be imposed on the prosecution, once evidence, sufficient on its face to prove
entrapment, is introduced by the defense. In the absence of some such showing
the court should enter a judgment of acquittal.
Id. at 1087.
37. See United States v. Mosley, 496 F.2d 1012, 1015-16 (5th Cir. 1974) ; United
States v. Oquendo, 490 F.2d 161, 163-64 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Bueno,
447 F.2d 903, 906 (5th Cir. 1971). For a discussion of the Fifth Circuit's position,
see note 17 supra.
38. See note 36 supra.
39. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
40. E.g., United States v. Mosley, 496 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1974).
41. The usefulness of such congressional action was suggested by the Russell
Court. See 411 U.S. at 433.
42. See notes 36-38 and accompanying text supra.
43. The Third Circuit's new procedure, if interpreted to extend to all entrapment
cases, would constitute an even more radical departure from Russell than the position
adopted by the Fifth Circuit. See note 17 supra.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

STUDENTS' RIGHTS - STUDENT'S CLAIM
THAT SCHOOL ATHLETIC CODE REGULATING HAIR LENGTH VIOLATED
HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS DOES NOT STATE A CLAIM FOR WHICH
RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED IN A FEDERAL FORUM.

Zeller v. Donegal School DistrictBoard of Education (1975)
A public high school student, Brent Zeller, was excluded from the
Donegal High School soccer team because he failed to comply with a
provision of the school's athletic code regulating hair length.' His parents
brought an action for damages and equitable relief 2 on his behalf in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania3
against the Donegal School District Board of Education and various school
officials, 4 alleging that the defendants' application of the code violated his
constitutionally protected rights of free speech, due process, and equal
protection.5 Following an evidentiary hearing,6 the district court granted
the defendants' motion to dismiss, 7 stating that the complaint failed to
raise a substantial federal question. s On appeal, the United States Court
1. Zeller v. Donegal School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 517 F.2d 600, 601 (3d Cir. 1975).
Rule 18 of the Donegal High School code of conduct for athletes required that hair
be "trimmed above the ears and neatly trimmed in back." Id. at 608 (Rosenn, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
2. Appellants conceded on appeal that their request for injunctive relief was
mooted by Brent Zeller's graduation from high school. Id. at 601 n.1. Thus, the only
viable claim remaining on appeal was one for damages.
3. The claim was asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) and its jurisdictional
counterpart, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970). 517 F.2d at 603. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceedings for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
4. The Zellers also joined as individual defendants the president and chief
executive officer of the school district, the superintendent of schools, the principal of
Donegal High School, the school's athletic director, and the coach of the soccer team.
517 F.2d at 601.
5. Id. at 613 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting). The complaint alleged violation of Brent
Zeller's right of free speech under the first amendment, and his right to due process
and equal protection under the fourteenth amendment. Id.
6. A hearing was conducted to determine whether plaintiffs' petition for a preliminary injunction should be granted. Id. at 601. The court heard testimony from both
sides and received a stipulation of facts. Id. at 601-02, quoting Appellants' Brief at 5.
7. The district court's opinion was unreported. It is unclear from the appellate
opinion whether the defendant in fact moved for a dismissal or for a judgment on
the pleadings. Chief Judge Seitz, in his dissent, stated that the district court treated
the defendants' motion for a judgment on the pleadings as a motion to dismiss under
rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and therefore, dismissed the complaint rather than entering judgment for the defendants. 517 F.2d at 611. The plurality
opinion accepted the plaintiffs' characterization of the district court's action as a grant
of a motion to dismiss. Id. at 601-02, citing Brief for Appellant at 5.
8. 517 F.2d at 602, citing Brief for Appellant at 5.
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of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed, 9 the plurality
holding that public school regulation of the length of male students' hair
did not implicate basic constitutional values and, hence, claims based upon
such regulations were not cognizable in federal courts. Zelier v. Donegal
School District Board of Education, 517 F.2d 600 (3d Cir. 1975).
Prior to the instant case, the Third Circuit had discussed the issue of
the existence of a student's constitutional right to wear long hair'0 in
Gere v. Stanley" and Stull v. School Board of Western Beaver JuniorSenior High School.' 2 Although the Gere court recognized its jurisdiction
to hear the complaint,' 3 it declined to decide whether there was a constitutional basis for the right,' 4 holding only that if the alleged right existed, it
9. Judges Aldisert, Hunter, Weis, and Garth composed the plurality, with

Judge Aldisert writing the opinion for the court. Judges Van Dusen, Adams, and
Gibbons joined in the dissent of Chief Judge Seitz. Judge Rosenn concurred in the
result reached by the plurality, but for different reasons; he dissented from the
plurality's resolution of the constitutional issue. For an explanation of Judge Rosenn's
position, see notes 32-45 and accompanying text infra.
10. Whether the United States Constitution guarantees a student the right to
choose his hair style is an issue which has evoked varying, and even contradictory,
responses from the other circuits. For cases in which the courts have been receptive
to these claims, see Holsapple v. Woods, 500 F.2d 49 (7th Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 901 (1974) ; Long v. Zopp, 476 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1973) ; Bishop v.
Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1971) ; Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir.
1970) ; cf. Dwen v. Barry, 483 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1973) (constitutional issue raised
by regulation of policeman's hair). For cases which have denied that such claims
warrant federal court consideration, see Hatch v. Goerke, 502 F.2d 1189 (10th Cir.
1974) ; Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989 (1972) ;
King v. Saddleback Jr. College Dist., 445 F.2d 932 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
979 (1971) (petitioner King), and 404 U.S. 1042 (1972) (petitioner Olff); Gfell v.
Rickelman, 441 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1971) ; cf. Baker v. California Land Title Co., 507
F.2d 895 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1046 (1975) (private employer's
regulation of male employees' hair length did not constitute sex discrimination).

The constitutional basis for the right to determine hair style has variously
been found in the overlapping rights guaranteed by the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment, Massie v. Henry, 455 F.2d 779, 783
(4th Cir. 1972); in the rights protected by the ninth and fourteenth amendments,
Bishop v. Colaw, supra at 1075; in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, Richards v. Thurston, supra at 1283; and has been stated to emanate from the
penumbra of either the first amendment's right to freedom of speech or the ninth
amendment's "additional fundamental rights," Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034, 1036
(7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970). See generally Goldstein, Reflections
on Developing Trends in the Law of Student Rights, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 612 (1970) ;
Gyory, The Constitutional Rights of Public School Pupils, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 201
(1971) ; Comment, Public Schools, Long Hair and the Constitution, 55 IOWA L. REv.
707 (1970); Note, A Dilemma in Public High Schools: School Board Authority v.
The Constitutional Right of Students to Wear Long Hair, 33 LA. L. REV. 697 (1973);
84 HARv. L. REV. 1702 (1971).
11. 453 F.2d 205 (3d Cir. 1971).
12. 459 F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1972).
13. 453 F.2d at 207-08. Relying upon 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970), the Gere
court ruled that it had jurisdiction to hear complaints properly brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), without regard to the ultimate disposition of the case upon the
merits. 453 F.2d at 208. The same jurisdiction was invoked by the plaintiffs in Zeller.
See note 3 supra.
14. 453 F.2d at 209 n.7. For the purposes of analysis, the Gere court assumed,
arguendo, that there was a right for a student to wear long hair. Id. at 209.
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was nevertheless subject to reasonable regulation by the state. 15 One year
later, in Stull, the court held that individual determination of hair length
was implicitly guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment 6 and that only an "outweighing" state interest could justify
7
abridgment of that determination.'
Notwithstanding its previous decisions in Gere and Stull, the Third
Circuit reexamined the student hair issue by considering Zeller. The
members of the court disagreed 18 upon the question of whether the determination of hair length implicated such basic constitutional values as to
justify federal jurisdiction, with Judge Rosenn's opinion tipping the balance
in favor of affirming the district court's dismissal of the complaint.
The plurality opinion, written by Judge Aldisert, was built upon a
policy foundation, with the disagreement among the judges characterized
as one concerning how broadly the Constitution should be interpreted to
find an actionable student right against the discretionary decisions of school
officials.' 9 The burgeoning number of claims brought under section 198320
persuaded the plurality that the federal judiciary should limit federal
jurisdiction for claims which are based upon novel and questionable in21
terpretations of the protections afforded by the fourteenth amendment.
They feared that widening the scope of actionable constitutional claims
would foster decisions based merely upon the individual notions and prefer22
ences of federal judges rather than upon established principles of law.
Although recognizing that constitutional interpretation inherently involves
value judgments, 23 and that certain rights may be protected as within the
penumbra of specific constitutional guarantees, 24 the plurality concluded
that interpretive analysis must be grounded upon "reasons that in their
generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate result that is
involved. 12 5 In the absence of such reasons, the plurality believed that the
15. Id.
16. 459 F.2d at 347.
17. Id. at 348. There was some disagreement among the judges of the Zeller
court with regard to the proper interpretation of the Stull requirement of an "outweighing" justification. See notes 44 & 54 infra.
18. See note 9 supra.
19. 517 F.2d at 602.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). The plurality noted that in 1960, 280 civil rights
cases were filed in United States district courts, and by 1974, the number had grown
to 12,530. 517 F.2d at 604, citing 1968 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS Table X2 (1969), and 1974 ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES

COURTS

Tables C-2, C-3 (1975).
21. 517 F.2d at 604. Judge Aldisert stated that claims which had traditionally
been pleaded under tort, property, and contract law in the state courts are now the
basis for actions which alleged constitutional deprivations and which are presented in
a federal forum. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 605, citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 487 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
25. 517 F.2d at 605, quoting Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19 (1959).
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value judgments of school officials should not be overturned.2 6
In support of its restrictive interpretation of the Constitution, the
plurality cited Wood v. Strickland27 as outlining the standard which a
federal court should apply in determining whether it should intrude upon
the operation of a state school system. Wood allows such an intrusion
only when "specific constitutional guarantees" are violated. 28 The plurality
found no specific congressional mandate nor precise holding of the United
States Supreme Court which recognized a constitutional right for a
student to determine his own hair length. 29 Concluding that student hair
cases did not meet the standard expressed in Wood, the court affirmed the
dismissal of the Zellers' complaint 3 ° and overruled Stull,31 the prior Third
Circuit decision recognizing the validity of such claims.
The majority necessary to sustain the district court's dismissal of the
complaint was attained by Judge Rosenn's concurring opinion. He reasoned that the claim for monetary damages8 2 could not be granted 3 since
the school officials enjoyed a qualified immunity under Wood. 34 Noting
that neither the complaint, 35 nor the preliminary hearing8 6 had established
26. 517 F.2d at 605.
27. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
28. Id. at 326. The Wood Court stated:
The system of public education that has evolved in this Nation relies necessarily
upon the discretion and judgment of school administrators and school board
members, and § 1983 was not intended to be a vehicle for federal court correction
of errors in the exercise of that discretion which do not rise to the level of
violations of specific constitutional guarantees.
Id. (emphasis added).
The plurality's reliance upon Wood seems ill-founded. The Wood decision was
concerned with protecting the independence of discretionary decisions made by school
officials. The Wood Court settled upon a qualified immunity from section 1983 damages
as the means for providing that protection. 420 U.S. at 321-22. On the other hand,
the issues in Zeller centered around whether there existed a particular student right
which was cognizable in the federal courts. The plurality seems to have given Wood
an overly broad interpretation by applying it to the determination of the existence
of a student right rather than to the propriety of permitting a particular remedy
against a school official for its abridgment. Wood more properly should be viewed as
a standard for determining whether liability lies for a presumed intrusion upon a
protected right. Judge Rosenn's application of Wood appears more in accord with
the focus and purpose of school officials' qualified immunity from section 1983
damages. See notes 32-39 and accompanying text supra.
29. 517 F.2d at 607.
30. Id. at 608.
31. Id. Judge Aldisert, recognizing the limited precedential weight accorded a
decision rendered by a mere plurality, explained the overruling of Stull:
Although the foregoing analysis reflects the views of only four judges of this
court, when considered with Judge Rosenn's view which would require only "a
rational basis for a hair regulation," the effect of today's decision is to overrule
Stull v. School Board . . . that held school officials must demonstrate "an outweighing state interest."
Id. (citations omitted); see note 44 and accompanying text supra.
32. See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
33. 517 F.2d at 609 (Rosenn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
34. 420 U.S. at 322.
35. 517 F.2d at 609.
36. Id.
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either criterion set forth in Wood - malicious intent on the part of the
school officials to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights,31 or their
knowledge that such action would violate a clearly established constitutional
right 38 - Judge Rosenn concluded that the complaint should be dismissed.3 9
Although Judge Rosenn reached this conclusion, he nevertheless felt
compelled to voice his disagreement with the plurality view concerning
the constitutional issue. 40 He phrased the issue as whether school regulation of hair length was a significant encroachment upon a student's personal freedom. 41 He agreed with Judge Aldisert that a student's right to
determine his hair style was not derived from the right of privacy found
42
in the penumbra of either the Bill of Rights or the ninth amendment.
He was unable to agree, however, that the right had no constitutional
basis, and concluded that it is a component of personal liberty protected
by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 43 Having recognized the existence of the right, Judge Rosenn then proposed what he
believed to be a less restrictive criterion for evaluating the state's interest
than the "outweighing interest" test of Stull. 44 In his opinion, the state
45
need only show a rational basis for a hair regulation in order to justify it.
In a dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Seitz disagreed with Judge
Rosenn's theory that the dismissal should be upheld because the school
officials enjoyed a qualified immunity from suit. 46 He argued that the
plaintiffs were not required to allege the absence of immunity in pleading
their cause of action, because immunity is an affirmative defense which
must be pleaded and proven by the defendants. 47 Since the district court
37. 420 U.S. at 322.
38. Id.
39. 517 F.2d at 609. Judge Rosenn noted that in light of the disagreement among
the circuit courts upon the existence of a constitutional basis for the right to determine hair length and the lack of guidance from the Supreme Court upon the question,
the Donegal School Board's action could not be construed to have been a knowing
disregard of a clearly established constitutional right. Id. Judge Rosenn also emphasized that the complaint was based not upon exclusion from school, but only upon
exclusion from the soccer team. He believed that this fact contributed to the complexity of the constitutional issues involved and indicated a failure to satisfy the
Wood criterion of a knowing violation of the student's constitutional right. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 610.
42. Id.
43. Id. Judge Rosenn also felt that school regulations based upon the length of
students' hair implicated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment,
because they create two classes of students, one of which is denied equal access to
education or extracurricular programs solely upon the basis of hair length. Id.
44. Judge Rosenn read Stull as judging the reasonableness of the hair regulation
in terms of other alternatives which were available to school officials. Id. at 611 n.3.
Chief Judge Seitz disagreed with this interpretation of Stull. See note 54 infra.
45. 517 F.2d at 611. Judge Rosenn listed "the furtherance of valid educational
goals, health, or other legitimate purposes" as satisfying the requirement that the
school regulation have a rational basis. Id.
46. Id. (Seitz, C.J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 612. While acknowledging that Wood establishes a qualified immunity
for school board members, the dissent found nothing in that opinion which would
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had considered only the allegations of the complaint in its dismissal of the
action, 48 the dissent argued that Judge Rosenn erred in affirming the dismissal upon grounds which the district court had not addressed.4 9
Turning to the constitutional issue, Chief Judge Seitz reasoned that
access to the federal courts should not hinge upon the subjective opinions
of judges regarding the relative importance of various personal liberties, °
and he found the heavy workload of the courts to be no excuse for such
selectivity. 51 In dissenting from the plurality's resolution of the constitutional issue, he believed the right to choose the length of one's hair to
be a liberty protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 52 Therefore, Chief Judge Seitz saw no reason to overrule Stull, 53
as he interpreted that decision to require only that state regulation of hair
length bear a rational relation to a legitimate state interest.5 4 The dissent
concluded with the observation that, in spite of the result reached in the
instant case, a majority of the court continued to believe that a constitutional claim was asserted in the context of student hair cases. 55
Despite the plurality's allusion to the potential danger present in
recognizing innovative complaints under section 1983,56 it may itself have
rendered a decision based merely upon the subjective opinions of individual judges rather than upon "visible, time-tested rules or principles of
substantive law."'57 There is substantial dispute over the characterization
of a student's right to choose his hair style as too trivial to merit federal
judicial inquiry into the basis of the state's regulation. 8 Arguably, such
reorder the burden of pleading and proving that immunity. Id. See generally 2A J.
MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 8.27[4] (Cum. Supp. 1973).
48. 517 F.2d at 612. The dissent noted that the consideration of a motion to dismiss, as opposed to the rendering a judgment for one of the parties, requires the
court to look only to the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint. Id.; cf. Duane v.
Altenburg, 297 F.2d 515 (7th Cir. 1962).
49. 517 F.2d at 612. The factual distinction between Wood and Zeller was of
particular concern to Chief Judge Seitz. The Wood decision established a qualified
immunity for school board members; Chief Judge Seitz saw nothing in that opinion
to intimate that it would extend without alteration to school officials such as the individual defendants in Zeller. Id. at 612-13; see note 4 supra.
50. 517 F.2d at 613.
51. Id. at 614.
52. Id. Because he found that the plaintiffs had asserted a claim under the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment, Chief Judge Seitz found it unnecessary
to address the plaintiffs' equal protection claim or the claim under the first amendment.
Id. at 615.
53. See text accompanying notes 16 & 17 supra.
54. 517 F.2d at 615. Chief Judge Seitz disagreed with the majority's belief that
Stull demanded an "outweighing" state interest to justify hair length regulations. Id.
55. Id. Chief Judge Seitz was referring to the fact that the four dissenters and
Judge Rosenn agreed upon the existence of constitutional protection for the right to
determine one's hair length.
56. See text accompanying notes 20-22 supra.
57. 517 F.2d at 604. The plurality had suggested that this, rather than "jural
impressionism," was the proper basis for judicial decisions. Id.
58. See note 10 supra.
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an admitted value judgment59 should have been accorded more justification than its mere assertion by the court. Unfortunately, the plurality chose
not to discuss what standards, ° if any, had been applied in determining
that the plaintiffs' contention did not raise a substantial federal question.6 '
Instead, the plurality summarily stated that student hair cases are not
cognizable in the federal courts, 6 2 thereby applying the policy of non-

interference with the public school system enunciated by the Supreme
Court in Epperson v. Alrkansas6

and Wood,6 4 and aligning itself with
65
the view expressed by the Tenth Circuit in Freeman v. Flake.
3

Although the Supreme Court admittedly has been reluctant to interfere with the decisions of school officials, 66 it has recognized the vital importance of securing constitutional freedoms in the public schools67 and
has not hesitated to intervene when necessary to protect those rights.6 3
Thus, the application of the policy of non-interference turns only upon a
conclusion that the asserted right does not have a constitutional basis.
A thorough examination of possible constitutional underpinnings 69 for the
freedom to determine the length of one's hair should have been prerequisite
to the application of the policy of non-interference. That policy should

59. 517 F.2d at 606. The plurality opinion readily admitted that interpretation of
the Constitution inherently involves making value judgments. Id.; see text accompanying note 23 supra.
60. In determining whether a particular right was "fundamental," the court
might have applied the standards enunciated by Justice Goldberg in his concurring
opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). Justice Goldberg
suggested that the courts look to the tradition and collective conscience of the
American people, the fundamental principles and liberties which formed the foundation of American political institutions, and the requirements of a free society in reaching decisions. Id. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
61. The plurality opinion declared that the asserted right did "not rise to the
dignity of a protectable constitutional right." 517 F.2d at 606.
62. Id. at 600.
63. 393 U.S. 97 (1968). After expressing a reluctance to intervene, the Supreme
Court nevertheless ruled that a statute prohibiting the teaching of the theory of evolution in Arkansas public schools violated the first and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 109.
64. 420 U.S. at 326; see note 28 supra.
65. 448 F.2d 258 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1032 (1972). The
Freeman court, reasoning that it is the province of the state school authorities and
the state courts to determine the necessity of hair regulation, found that a complaint
based upon school regulation of the length of a male student's hair did not implicate
basic constitutional values and was not cognizable in a federal court Id. at 261-62.
66. See notes 28 & 64 and accompanying text supra.
67. E.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). In Shelton, the Court stated
that "[tihe vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than
in the community of American schools." Id. at 487.
68. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)
(school officials' prohibition of peaceful wearing of black armbands by protesting
students violated their first amendment rights); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97
(1968) (state law proscribing teaching of a particular scientific theory held to violate
first and fourteenth amendments); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (state
law forcing a teacher to disclose every organizational tie as a condition of employment
violated first amendment).
69. See note 10 supra.
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not have been interpreted to justify a superficial treatment of the asserted
constitutional sources of protection.
The plurality's refusal to search for a constitutional basis for a
student's right to choose his hair length was based upon a seemingly collateral evaluation of the inundation of the federal courts with civil rights
claims. 70 Such analysis bears the danger which is inherent in selective
enforcement based upon judges' subjective valuation of various personal
freedoms - as Chief Judge Seitz suggested, it approaches an abdication
of the judiciary's responsibility and a devaluation of personal liberty 1
The solution to the burdensome workload of the nation's courts is not to
be found in a judicial hierarchy of citizens' personal freedoms, but rather
lies in careful legislative action. Even if it should become necessary to
limit access to the federal courts on the basis of hierarchical importance,
it would be difficult to perceive cases which should receive more thorough
scrutiny than those involving the protection of personal liberty.7 2 As
Chief Judge Seitz emphasized, "[T]he federal courts' most fundamental
task is the protection of constitutionally guaranteed personal liberties.17 3
The fact that Zeller could not command a majority will undoubtedly
have a limiting effect upon the extent of its applicability to future student
hair cases. Absent the presence of either criterion set forth by Wood,74 it
seems clear that a claim for monetary damages75 for the denial of a public
school student's right to determine the length of his hair will not lie in the
Third Circuit - the plurality declining to find a constitutional basis for
such claims

76

and Judge Rosenn determining that school officials enjoy a

qualified immunity from liability for damages.7 7 However, because Judge
Rosenn and the four dissenters did find that a *constitutionally protected
right was implicated by hair length regulation, 78 a future claim for equitable relief might stand upon different footing. 79
70. 517 F.2d at 607; see note 20 supra.
71. Chief Judge Seitz stated:
Certainly the federal courts are busy, but to sacrifice constitutional rights for
the sake of alleviating the workload is to abdicate our responsibility. . . . If,
based on our value standards, we pick and choose what constitutional aspects of
personal liberty we will protect in the federal courts, we shall . . . denigrate
the importance of individual rights in American society.
517 F.2d at 614 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting).
72. The Supreme Court has recognized the well-established tradition of personal liberty:
No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law,
than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person,
free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.
Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
73. 517 F.2d at 614.
74. See notes 37 & 38 and accompanying text supra.
75. See note 2 supra.
76. 517 F.2d at 606.
77. Id. at 608-09.
78. See notes 43 & 52 and accompanying text supra.
79. In some cases, even though monetary damages have been denied as inappropriate, equitable relief has been granted for an asserted interference with the right to
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Since the court did not reach the merits of the case, Zeller left unsettled the standard to be applied in weighing the state's justification for
regulation of hair length. However, in light of Judge Rosenn's opinion
and the dissent's interpretation of Stull, it appears that the state would only
be required to show a rational relation to a legitimate state purpose in
order to justify such a regulation."0 Thus, to the extent that Stull required
the showing of an outweighing state interest,8 ' it is no longer viable.
Nevertheless, Stull's underlying premise, that the length of one's hair is
a constitutionally protected choice, continues to have vitality despite the
Zeller decision.
In light of the split of the Zeller court, it is doubtful that the decision
will be followed in other circuits.8 2 For the Third Circuit, however, Zeller
may presage an impact far beyond student hair cases. The plurality's
concern with judicial economy may signal the initiation of a policy of
restrictive access to a federal forum in the Third Circuit, based upon the
court's desire to control the proliferating caseload of the federal judiciary.
James L. Murray
determine one's personal appearance. See, e.g., Long v. Zopp, 476 F.2d 180 (4th Cir.
1973) (student was denied monetary award but was granted injunctive relief where
high school athletic coach withheld "letter" award because of student's noncompliance
with hair code).
80. However, the state may have difficulty in satisfying even this test. In the
instant case, for example, it is difficult to imagine what legitimate state purpose was
furthered by requiring of those who participated in athletic activity grooming standards
which did not apply to the student body as a whole. One need only look to the tonsorial
tastes of modern professional and collegiate athletes to become aware that the length
of hair affects neither the safety of the participant nor the quality of his performance.
81. See text accompanying notes 16 & 17 supra.
82. In its first pronouncement in the area of hair length regulation, the United
States Supreme Court recently upheld restrictions placed upon policemen's hair length
by a county police commissioner in Kelley v. Johnson, 44 U.S.L.W. 4469 (April 5,
1976). The Court limited the applicability of the decision by emphasizing the difference
between the state's interest in regulating its own employees, and its interest in regulating the citizenry at large. In its analysis, the Court declined to decide whether the
general public had a right to liberty regarding matters of personal appearance grounded
in the fourteenth amendment; the Court merely stated that if such a right existed, it
was not necessarily extended to state employees. Id. at 4471. The Court, however,
did take an approach which may have significant implications for other types of hair
length regulation. By placing the burden of negativing a rational basis for the regulation upon the party challenging it, rather than upon the state to justify it, the Court
may have predetermined the ultimate decision through the assignation of the burden
of proof. Id. at 4472.
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